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Abstract 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate into the causes and the long term durability of Atlanticism 
in the Czech Republic. During the Iraq War the Czech Republic was labeled as part of ‘ "ew’ Europe, 
a title given to all those states who sided with America over the European powers led by France and 
Germany . Over the past 6 years the Czech Republic has been subject to the process of 
Europeanization while major changes in the external environment have occurred. The research 
methods employed to answer the effect of these changes of the orientation of Czech Foreign and 
Security policy consisted of a wide review of the relevant literature, case studies and open ended 
interviews with policymakers and academics involved in the process.  The findings of the research are 
that Czech Atlanticism is rooted in the nation’s geo-political history but is also a strategic calculation 
on the part of Czech elites. However with a decline in Atlanticism has already begun to take place 
within Czech society as a result of decreased American interest in the CEE region and Russian 
activities in its near abroad. In conclusion current trends point to a future decline of Atlanticism in the 
Czech Republic the extent to which will be determined by four key variables, What type of EU 
emerges, which political party/coalition is in power, EU’s ability to tackle the Russian question and 
US policies towards Central Europe and the wider world.   
Key Words: Atlanticism, Czech Republic, Security, ESDP, Russia 
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Glossary of Terms 
Political Parties 
ČSSD  Česka strana socialně demokraticka 
 (Czech Social Democratic Party) 
HSD – SMS  Hnuti za samospravnou demokracii – Společnost pro Moravu 
 a Slezsko (Movement for Self-Government Democracy – Union 
 for Moravia and Silesia) 
KDU  Křesťanska a demokraticka unie (Christian and Democratic Union) 
KDU – ČSL  Křesťansko-demokraticka unie – Československa strana lidova 
 (Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party) 
KDS  Křesťanska demokraticka strana (Christian Democratic Party) 
KSČ  Komunisticka strana Československa 
 (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) 
KSČM  Komunisticka strana Čech a Moravy 
 (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) 
LSU  Liberalně – socialni unie (Liberal Social Union) 
ODA  Občanska demokraticka aliance (Civic Democratic Alliance) 
ODS  Občanska demokraticka strana (Civic Democratic Party) 
OF  Občanske Forum (Civic Forum) 
SPR – RSČ  Sdruženi pro republiku – Republikanska strana Československa 
 (Union for the Republic – Czechoslovak Republican Party) 
SZ  Strana zelenych (Green Party) 
US  Unie Svobody (Freedom Union) 
Other  
CEE               Central Eastern Europe 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1. Background
1
 
At the 2002 Prague Summit British writer Timothy Garton Ash asked having just received 
their invitations to NATO would be states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) still be such 
stanch Atlanticists in 8 years time?  Today 2 years shy of the 10 years landmark it seems high 
time to seek to answer Ash’s query.    
A successful investigation into Ash’s question would be an important contribution to the 
discourse on the European Union in the realm of foreign and security policy. As the world 
moves away from a system of American Uni-polarity and towards a more Multi-polar world 
order the issue of what sort of power the European Union will emerge as in the external realm 
will have major ramifications for both Europe and for the future world order. With China, 
India and to a lesser extent Brazil and Russia all emerging forces in a new Multi-Polar world 
order countering US hegemony questions remain whether the European Union will take its 
seat amongst the major global players or instead let other powers control.  
 
Back in March the European Union’s new representative for foreign affairs and security 
policy Catherine Ashton stated ‘If we pull together we can safeguard our interest…if not 
others will make decisions for us’. Yet despite the passage of the Lisbon treaty creating the 
post of high Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security and giving the EU more powers 
in the security realm major doubts about the EU’s potential capacity in this realm remain.  
Since its inception the European Union has made great advances in its 1st pillar (economic 
integration). The Maastricht treaty in 1992 created a 2nd pillar as part of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) but while advances have been made in the soft areas of foreign 
policy (human rights, democracy, foreign aid) little progress has been made in the hard 
security policy areas ( Force projection, territorial defense).  
 
                                                           
1Turf wars must end, EU official declares, International Herald Tribune, March 10th 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/11/world/europe/11iht-
union.html?scp=5&sq=march%201O%20ashton&st=cse 
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Differences of opinion exist among policymakers and academics as to why such a lack of 
progress has been made in this area, some cite national policymakers reluctance to give up 
decision making power in this delicate field requiring intergovernmental co-operation, others 
feel that the security umbrella and security guarantee’s provided by the United States under 
Article 5 of NATO has resulted in sense of comfort and safety amongst the European public 
who feel safe and lack the appetite for advancement in this area.   More recently an idea that 
increasingly is gaining credence is that Europe lacks of common Security Culture with the 
most notably divide emerging between New and Old Member states. 
 
In order for Europe to form a coherent Security Culture a consensus among its 27 strong 
members has been cited as a necessary prerequisite. In particular the divide between Czech 
Republic and the Central/Eastern and West European states in terms of security culture and 
position towards America has been cited as a gap that needs to be narrowed. These two 
separate approaches can be loosely pooled as Europeanist and Atlanticist. The different 
Europeanist and Atlanticist approaches to European security came to the fore in 2003 in the 
run-up to operation freedom Iraqi when the CEE states decided to adapt a pro-American pro 
war in Iraq stance and agree to send forces into the coalition of the willing. In contrast the 
major European powers France and Germany were the war’s most ardent critics and vetoed 
such a war at the UN Security Council meeting.  
 
This division between the Franco-German backbone of the European Union and the 
candidates from CEE was articulated by the then US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s 
controversial provocation that Europe had become divided into two blocs, Old and New 
Europe. These divisions between the Europeanist and Atlanticist wings have become further 
highlighted in the debates over issues like Iraq, the future of NATO in European security, 
development of a common policy towards Russia and more recently the case of Missile 
Defense.  
 
In this thesis I will ask the question of whether Europe really can be boxed into ‘Old’ and 
‘New’ Europe by focusing on ‘New’ Europe and whether its security preferences are that 
different from Old Europe.  Rather than focus on the heterogeneous CEE (Central and Eastern 
Europe) region this thesis will concentrate on one CEE state within the region the Czech 
Republic.  
10 
 
 
In a report written by Marcin Zaborowski (2003) he asked the question whether EU 
membership would lessen the Atlanticist orientation of Poland the regions most ardent 
Atlanticist.2 In response Zaborowski said the contrary would happen and outlined three 
reasons why he felt as such.  The first reason had to do with Poland’s Eastern frontier a region 
where the US and not the EU would be influential ‘the EU is not so interested in developing 
an active policy towards the European parts of the former Soviet Union, whilst the US has 
been far more involved in the region’. The second was that Poland would not support the 
French model for the EU as an external actor which involved ‘turning the EU into a 
counterweight for NATO’ and finally because Poland’s transition to democracy ‘ instilled into 
Polish elites a great sense of gratitude and loyalty, which would not be instantaneously swept 
aside once Poland became an EU member’. If there is one aspect this report especially 
highlights it is how quick things change in International Relations. Indeed Zaboroski’s three 
main reservations are to a stronger or lesser extent no longer viable as we have seen over the 
past 7 years the EU take on a more active role in its Eastern neighborhood, the French idea of 
Europe as a counterweight diminish and also Poland’s sense of gratitude and loyalty begin to 
decline, swept away by the Obama administrations prioritizing of relations with Russia over 
Central Europe and reversal on missile defense. Thus in 2010 a new investigation into 
whether EU membership has and will continue to lessen the Atlanticist orientation of CEE 
countries is important. Has there been a decline of Atlanticism in the Czech Republic or is 
Atlanticism still as strong as it was back in 2002?3 Should Atlanticism be considered as 
temporary phenomenon that pass as the Czech Republic integrates and ‘socialize’ themselves 
further into the European Union’s decision making bodies.  Or should Atlanticism be 
considered a phenomenon that is so deeply rooted in geo-political history and national interest 
of the Czech Republic that it is here to stay?. 
 
                                                           
2 Zaborowski, Marcin, ‘ Between Power and Weakness Poland – A new Actor in the Transatlantic Security’, 
Conference paper for the Center for International Relations, September 6th 2003 
3Ash, T.G. (2002), ‘ Speech at the NATO Transformation’ conference organized by the Aspen Institute and the 
Prague NATO Summit Host committee, Prague 20, November  
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1.2. Research Focus 
The primary focus of this research is on the orientation and preferences of Czech foreign and 
Security policy between the Brussels, NATO and Washington. 
 
 By focusing on this question I hope in a broader context to shed light on the strength of 
Atlanticism among many CEE countries and how the Atlanticism versus Europeanism debate 
will influence the development of the ESDP in the future. Thus my hope is that this research 
will be to aid to the current discourse on one of the factors cited as preventing the emergence 
of a strong European Security and Defense project by focusing on one issue, Atlanticism 
versus Europeanism, within one country (Czech Republic) within one artificial bloc of 
European countries (Visegrad states).  4 
 
1.3. Overall Aim and Individual Research Objectives 
My Research objectives are 
•  To identify how a small state in the International system such as the Czech Republic 
attempts to  maximize their security in the current international system  
• To account for Czech preferences for alliances over neutrality 
• To explore whether the Czech Republic has a strategic culture and if so to identify 
what are the main determinants influencing Czech Security culture.  
• To critically account for the origins and motivations behind Prague’s strong sense of 
Atlanticism in security policy.  
• To critically assess of strength of Czech Republic’s Atlanticism and gauge its 
durability. 
• To critically access if Czech support for the ESDP project is increasing and what the 
future position of the Czech Republic towards the ESDP is likely to be. 
                                                           
4 European states are often split into artificially created groups which tend to have commonalities, eg Visegrad 
countries, Benelux countries, etc.  
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Two main vehicles will be exploited to facilitate this study: an indebt review of relevant 
literature and the collection and analysis of empirical date.  
1.4. Scholarly contribution 
This research is valuable in that it is one of the few pieces of research aimed specifically at 
trying to ascertain the security culture of the Czech Republic. Indeed on the whole there is a 
lack of research into the security cultures of the CEE states with the most notable exception 
being Zaborowski who has explored the security culture of the Czech Republic. While a true 
investigation of this topic is something for a PHD thesis5 identifying the basic themes of CZ 
strategic culture is beneficial. The need for research into this issue is in fact probably best 
represented by the fact that many of the policymakers and academics interviewed during the 
research expressed the need for research and their interest in doing further research into the 
topic.  
 
This research is also valuable in that the basic security preferences of the CEE states have 
been understudied since their accession into the EU (2004). Prior to this much research was 
done of the security preferences of these countries and how this would impact of the European 
Security and Defence Policy ( ESDP).  However, over the past 6 years little research has been 
done. This is especially surprising considering that during this time the CEE countries have 
been subject to Europeanization and also there has been considerable changes in the external 
environment. This thesis will aim to bridge this gap in academic research.   
 
Also,  the timing and the recent and ongoing nature of events such as Obama’s ‘reset strategy’ 
towards Russia demands investigation. Only last month a conference was held in Prague 
between President Obama and 11 Central European leaders. While only last weekend the 
2010 Czech general elections were held. This research aims to give an academic underpinning 
to issues that have only thus far being looked at through the lens of the media.  
 
My research strategy and empirical date of interviews in that they go some way towards 
compensating for the lack of a recent Czech Security Strategy. This is important in that Czech 
Security strategy was written in 2003 and has not been updated since. Thus, without an 
                                                           
5 The author  is considering doing further investigation into this topic for his PHD 
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updated Security Strategy interviews with academics and policymakers are the best way to 
gauge changes since the last Security document was written.  
 
I also hope to bring a modest contribution to the analysis of Czech security culture, the 
differences in preferences and security cultures in New and Old Member states and a broader 
reflection on the convergence of European strategic cultures.  
 
1.5. Methodology 
 
This research employs a combination of methods including a theoretical considerations 
section, a review of the existing literature written on the topic, case studies and qualitative 
interviews. 
In my theoretical considerations section in Chapter 2 focuses on two areas related to security. 
The first involves a general look at how the dominant realist theory of International Relations 
(IR) looks at security and the second being theories of statecraft.  
In my theories of IR section attention will be given to the dominant realist theory of IR with a 
constructivist framework also employed as an added explanatory lens. Through a 
constructivist lens I will look at the security culture of a given state. Security Culture is an 
under researched and undervalued explanatory variable in IR, by investigating into the Czech 
state’s security culture I felt I could bring additional understanding complementing realist 
theories.   
In my theories of statecraft section attention will be given to how small states seek to 
maximize security in the International system.  
In order to gain an insight into Czech security preferences vis-à-vis the US and vis-à-vis the 
CFSP case studies will be utilized. In looking at the Atlanticism orientation of Czech security 
I will focus on two case studies the Operation Freedom Iraqi and the Missile Defense project. 
In analyzing Czech security preferences vis-à-vis the CFSP a case study of the Czech EU 
presidency will be utilized. Focus will be given to this case study as the EU presidency gives 
the holding state the opportunity to define the EU agenda for a 6 month period and is a clear 
indication of state preferences with the CFSP.  
Also utilized will be interviews with leading foreign policy experts in the Czech Republic 
from both academic and practitioner backgrounds. These interviews provide a good account 
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of partisan positions of foreign policy issues and also provide the opportunity to cross check 
the credibility of my assessment.  
This method of collecting empirical data through interviews with members of the Czech elite 
is focal because foreign and security policy in the Czech Republic at present currently is 
dominated by elites in the Ministry of Defense ( MOD) , The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) and leaders in the main political parties. Much less attention is given to public opinion 
than would be the case in many Western democracies and is not as major a variable 
influencing foreign and security policy. Thus in order to fully understanding Czech foreign 
policy actions and the likely future orientation of Czech security in depth interviews with the 
members of the elite who deal with these issues on a day to day basis is a far more effective 
strategy than a broader list of interviews with the general public attempting to gauge public 
opinion.  
 
1.6. Thesis Map 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction  
This chapter provided background information on the topic itself, on the value and focus of 
my research and on the methods I intend to employ in this research.  
 
Chapter 2 - A theoretical considerations chapter 
2.1 This chapter will begin with a review of the dominant theory of International Relations, 
realism and what realist literature says about state security. This theory will later by 
complemented with a constructivist approach to International security.  
2.2. This section will also look at theories of statecraft and how small states in International 
Relations seek to maximize security. Here focus will be given to alliances and alliance theory 
formation. 
2.3. This section will look at the concept of strategic cultures.  Security Culture is a very fluid 
concept and in this section I will come up with my own variables which best explain the 
Atlanticist orientation of Czech security policy post 1989. Special focus will be given to 
Czech Republic’s geo-political history and how formative experiences in Czech history have 
impacted on current Czech security policy.  
This chapter will test my first hypothesis which states that ‘ Czech Republic’s security policy 
Atlanticist orientation is rooted in its geographical position, historical experience but also a 
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strategic calculation on the part of Czech elites with the primary objective of Czech security 
policy being keeping American military commitments to the region alive and credible’ 
 
Chapter 3 
3.1. This section will involve researching into Czech Atlanticism from 1999 onwards through 
the lens of three case studies the Kosovo war, the Iraq war and the missile defense system. 
The position of the main political parties and the divide within Czech society over these issues 
will also be looked at.  
3.2. This section will look at Czech Preferences vis-à-vis the CFSP through the case study of 
the Czech EU Presidency.   
This chapter will test my second hypothesis which states that   
‘ Given the geo-political and historical context, Czech Republic still sees Russia as a major 
security threat to its sovereignty and independence and has developed its security strategies 
towards the US, "ATO and European Defense to check direct Russian influence in its affairs’. 
 
Chapter 4  
4.1. The beginning of this chapter will look at the impact of Obama’s ‘reset strategy’ towards 
Russia on the orientation of Czech Security policy. Here I will show that we are beginning to 
see a re-alignment of Czech security policy with increasing support for the CFSP project as a 
realization of it being a second pillar of which to base security. With events being of very 
recent nature tangible gains might not be immediately apparent however by looking at Czech 
preferences in the negotiations on the New NATO strategic concept and the position of 
Poland a regional leader in the CEE region one can see evidence of a normalization of 
relations with the US and increasing support for the ESDP.  
4.2. The second part of this chapter and the conclusion of this thesis will make predictions as 
to the future position of the Czech Republic towards the ESDP, NATO and Washington. My 
argument here will be that Atlanticism is likely to decline in the future with the extent 
depending on a number of key variables the first of which is which political party is in power. 
This variable will becomes increasingly important in the future because as Czech democracy 
matures we are likely to see parliament play an increasingly important role in foreign policy 
making and also political parties in the future will be less inclined to go against a Czech 
public opinion than they have in the past. 
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The two key variables that will decide how big a change will occur will be what type of ESDP 
emerges and the US’s position towards Central Europe. With regards the ESDP I will argue 
that CZ attitudes will depend very much on what type of ESDP emerges over the coming 
years. Czech's preference will be for a strong ESDP which should seek to complement 
Washington and will not seek to challenge American hegemony. Within the ESDP a need to 
find a consensus on how to deal with Russia will be highlighted as the key factor with the 
position of Germany towards Russia being of key importance. Future American policy 
towards the region and the global scene will also be significant, with an increasingly 
accommodating approach towards Russia and a Unilateralist policy likely to speed up Czech 
shifts towards the ESDP. 
This chapter will also test my hypothesis which states that ‘Atlanticism in the Czech Republic 
will decline in upcoming years with the Czech Republic becoming a greater supporter of the 
European defense project however the extent of the decline will be dependent on three key 
variables, which political party is in power, the type of EU that emerges and the degree to 
which Czech interests are supported by the European defense project’.   
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Considerations Outline 
2.1.   Introduction 
This chapter is a theoretical considerations chapter rather than a literature review. The 
motivation behind a theoretical considerations rather than a literature review chapter is that I 
am not adopting or testing a single theory (e.g. balance of power)  to explain the orientation of 
Czech Foreign and Security Policy but instead I am using very case specific approach. My 
research is an inductive one and involves working towards proving my own three hypothesis 
rather than testing others.  While much academia has been written on how small states aim to 
maximize security little has been written directly in relation to the Czech Republic.  Thus in 
this Chapter I will begin by evaluating the main literature of how small states aim to 
maximize security in the dominant realist field and also the Constructivist approach. Later in 
this chapter I will relate it back to the Czech Republic. My aim is that at the end of this 
chapter I will have established my own variables system which contribute to current Czech 
security culture and can be used later in this research when we discuss the long term 
durability of Czech Atlanticism and involvement in the ESDP. This theoretical considerations 
chapter focuses on objectives 1 and 2 and 3 as set out in sub section 1.3. of this chapter. 6 
(The, third fourth and fifth objectives of this study will be met through the vehicle of 
empirical data collection and also derived as the result of the findings of objective 1 and 2) 
This theoretical considerations chapter will examine the main issues in Czech Foreign and 
Security Policy by adapting both a realist and a constructivist framework in a complementary 
fashion. The first section of this chapter will adopt a realist framework and will look at both 
how small states in International Relations traditionally aim to maximize their security 
according to the realist theory of International Relations. Geo-political considerations will 
also be looked at with the integration of the Czech Republic into these structures being looked 
also from the broader global geo-political perspective. Alliances are a fundamental aspect of 
how small states in International Relations aim to maximize security thus the realist literature 
                                                           
6 To investigate into whether the Czech Republic has a strategic culture and if so to identify what are the main 
determinants influencing Czech Security culture, e.g. history, geography, rationalist explanation.  
To explore how a small state in the International system such as Czech Republic believes it can maximize its 
own security through alliances. ( The role that the Czech Republic sees for both the ESDP and NATO in their 
security will be looked at here) 
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on alliances and in particular the work of prominent authors such as Kenneth Waltz and 
Stephan Walt will be considered. However this thesis is aimed at accessing the long term 
orientation of Czech Foreign and Security policy, understanding Czech motivations in joining 
NATO and the EU back in 1999 and 2004 are helpful in this broader task yet with so many 
other important variables needing consideration whether Czech alliance behavior can be 
explained by bandwagoning or balancing will be looked  at only briefly and not in the same 
depth as a literature review chapter dedicated entirely to alliances would produce.    
In order to look at Czech security and foreign policy it is necessary to also take into account 
non-material as material factor something which the dominant neo-realist framework of 
International Relations fails to do.  Focus will be given to material factors but also non 
material factors such as ideas, beliefs and perceptions which are overlooked as part of the 
Neo-Realist theory of IR but a fundamental part of the growing Constructivist theory of 
International Relations.  The first question I seek to answer is how can one account for Czech 
preferences for joining the NATO alliance rather than staying neutral. In answering this 
question attention will also be given to Reiter’s theory of learning which argues that 
Individual experiences of a state are powerful determinants of alliance preferences and that 
the alliance choices of minor powers in the 20th century were determined mainly be lessons 
from their formative national experiences. This theory has lots of explanatory power in 
explaining Czech preferences for alliances and rejection of neutrality as an option. The theory 
also advances the notion that states form certain preconceptions about other states during this 
formative experiences which impacts on their alliance formation afterwards.  
By adopting elements of a constructivist approach I also aim to research into the idea of a 
nation having its own unique strategic culture. In this section I will look at what security 
culture is, why it matters and what implications a nation’s security culture will have on its 
security and alliance policy. After completing my review of the literature written on security 
culture I will later in the chapter identify the main elements of Czech Security culture. In 
creating my own variables to analyze Czech security culture I will focus on the nation’s 
history,  size, it’s geographical setting but domestic political setting. History as a factor in 
current Czech security preferences will be used very critically but I will identify certain key 
moments/ formative experiences which impact on Czech security preferences today and will 
likely be factors in the future.  A successful research into the main aspects of Czech security 
culture would provide an excellent lens through which to identify the Czech origins and 
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motivations behind Atlanticism but also towards objectives 4 and 5 on future durability of 
Czech Atlanticism and attitudes towards the ESDP. At the end of this section it is hoped that a 
critical understanding of the key issues involving alliances and security culture will have been 
exhibited, that the reader will be better informed in these areas and that there will emerge a 
clear focus and justification for empirical research and qualitative interviews in order to 
answer the questions raised in objectives four and five.  
A sensible starting point of the chapter is to look at the existing literature on how small states 
in IR traditionally seek to maximize their security.  This will be followed by research into the 
concept of security culture. Before moving on to this I will first outline my level of analysis. 
While IR theories have addressed the foreign policies of great powers they have largely 
ignored small states. Moreover when they do refer to weak states, systemic rather than 
domestic factors are accorded casual primacy.  This chapter will reject both these approaches 
and show why there is a need to study small states in International Relations and why 
concentrating on systemic factors while totally overlooking domestic factors leads to a poor 
analysis. One that is is especially weak in the case of the Czech Republic where one must take 
into account domestic considerations.  
 
2.2.   Level of analysis – the Limitations of "eo-Realism 
This section will challenge the current existing wisdom that domestic considerations are 
largely irrelevant in explaining small state behavior. While mainstream IR has ignored the 
study of weak states, scholars have suggested that we can account for the behavior of small 
states by focusing on the international system.  The reason according is Elman is ‘since small 
states are more preoccupied with survival than are the great powers, the international system 
will be the most relevant system of analysis for explaining foreign policy choices. 7The 
general wisdom and one promoted by neo-realist scholars such as Waltz is that domestic 
determinants will be less salient when studying small state behavior because external 
constraints are more severe and the international situation is more compelling8. Including 
                                                           
7 Elman, Miriam ‘ The foreign policies of small states: challenging neorealism in its own backyard’, British 
Journal of Political Science, April 1995: 172 
8 Waltz, Kenneth, ‘ International Politics’, 194-195 
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domestic affairs in our analysis would only detract from an already satisfactory explanation 
based on the small states position in the International system and its interaction with the great 
powers.  Changes in small state foreign policies are considered tiny in comparison to 
fluctuations in the structure of the international system and the degree of threat posed by the 
great powers. 9  
Neo-realism assumes that international constraints influence state behavior. In general 
international pressures override domestic interests, internal political struggles and the 
characteristics of particular states in foreign policy decision making. 10A state’s behavior is 
viewed as a response to the constraints and incentives of its aggregate power (Distribution of 
capabilities) relative to others or the degree of aggressive intent on the part of the external 
actors. (Balance of Threat). Neo-realists assume that statesmen will respond rationally to 
these preconditions and will choose that foreign-policy course which is most likely to 
maximize security benefits and to minimize security risks.  While neo-realists recognize that 
systemic/ structural factors may prevent statesmen for pursuing optimal strategies, it is 
presumed that elites are domestically unconstrained. 11According to neo-realism all states can 
be ‘black boxed’ because whatever their internal characteristics, all states nonetheless act in a 
similar way to ensure their security in this self help world.  
In contrast domestic level of analysis theories expect that state attributes and societal conflicts 
will affect foreign policy choices. It is assumed that foreign policy will not always reflect 
national security interests or structural imperatives. Rather the characteristics of particular 
states and ideologies or local interests will often render statesmen incapable of responding to 
exigencies of the international environment.12 
In contrast to the existing conventional wisdom I will argue that whether external or domestic 
factors matter more is an empirical question and should not be assumed a priori. In a contest 
between levels of analysis neither domestic nor international agreements automatically win 
and in the case of the Czech Republic both need to be studied simultaneously. In this thesis I 
                                                           
9Waltz : opt cit 184-185 
10Waltz : opt cit: 72-73 
11 Waltz: opt cit: 74 
12 Waltz: opt cit: 74 
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will show how factors such the institutional setting, the political parties in power as well as 
the external environment influence Czech military strategy. If I can successfully prove that 
domestic politics matters even in these instances where we would expect it should not, then I 
will have provided a strong argument and support for domestic level theorizing. Thus a 
successful refutation of received wisdom on the dominance of neo-realism in small state 
behavior in this dissertation would do much to legitimize domestic level approaches while 
simultaneously diminishing neo-realisms claims to have explanatory primacy in the study of 
IR. I will be countering the neo-realist discourse and echoing the view of Snyder who notes 
that ‘Realism must be recaptured from those who look only at politics between societies, 
ignoring what goes on within societies13’ 
• Second Image Reversed 
In order to explain the foreign policy of the Czech Republic it is necessary to pay attention to 
international as well as domestic development. The interaction between the international and 
domestic politics is thus responsible for the resultant foreign policy of the state and this 
linkage requires that both levels ( International and Domestic) should be examined 
simultaneously.  Neither level alone is sufficient to explain Czech Foreign and Security Policy 
and both levels need to be approached simultaneously to understand the situation. This thesis 
will thus use a second image reversed level of analysis and will examine the relationship 
between the external environment and domestic institutions and politics. In this work I will 
follow the level of analysis proposed by Gourevitch who concludes that ‘The international 
system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of them. 
Economic relations and military pressures constrain an entire range of domestic behaviors , 
from policy decisions to political forms. International relations and domestic politics are 
therefore so interrelated that they should be analyzed simultaneously as whole’. 14 
  
                                                           
13  Also the analysis of alliance choices in this dissertation is limited only to small states. Greater 
simplicity of minor powers foreign interests means that experiences can be more easily decoded as successes or 
failures, as a minor power focuses mainly on the question of how its alliance or neutrality affected the national 
security and territorial integrity of the homeland.  
14 Gourevitch, Peter, ‘ The second image reversed: The international sources of Domestic Politics’, International 
Organization, no 32 ( Autumn) 1978:  911 
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Alliances or neutrality 
One of the questions that also will be dealt with in this chapter will be how one account for 
state preferences for alliance above neutrality can. An alliance is defined as ‘A formulated 
mutual commitment to contribute military assistance in the event one of the alliance partners 
is attacked’. 15 ‘ Whether a state choose alliance or neutrality is likely to depend on whether it 
believes that alliances pose too great a risk of involvement or it believes that international co-
operation is necessary to protect its security. When deciding whether to enter an alliance or 
remain neutral, a nation must consider that entering an alliance in peacetime provides the 
benefits of extended deterrence and military assistance in the event of a war, at the expense of 
raising the risks of being involved in wars of no direct interest to the nation. Neutrality offers 
the benefit of decreasing the changes of involvement in wars of other nations, with the cost 
that the nation has no allies to help deter potential aggressors or defend against attacks. This is 
a choice for which there is no universal, indisputable answer; neither neutrality nor alliance is 
a logically dominant strategy for all times.  
Here it is interesting to compare Czech Republic’s strong commitment towards alliances with 
Austria’s position of neutrality. Considering that both countries have a roughly equal 
population and similar geographically position in Central Europe why is it that preferences of 
the two states differ so much? The main factor behind this I will argue has to do with non 
material factors with both countries having very different historical experiences and very 
different perceptions of what constitute a threat (Different perceptions of Russia). Czech 
Republic drew lessons from its formative events that impacted on its decision to pursue 
alliance strategy in protecting its national security after 1989. 
 
2.3. Combining Realist and Constructivist theories of Security 
In analyzing Czech security interests towards the ESDP and America I will in this upcoming 
section adopt a combination of realist and constructivist theories. In particular great emphasis 
will be given to the concept of security culture. In this section I will argue that realist and 
Constructivists approaches rather than contrasting one another can be used in a 
                                                           
15Morganthau, Hans, ‘ Allianes in Theory and Practice’, in Arnold Wolfers ed, ‘ Alliance policy in the Cold 
War’ ( Baltimore University Press, 1959), p 188 
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complementary fashion. In supporting a Constructivist lens I will be supporting the work of 
Constructivists who explicitly accept that power matters in International Relations. In this 
thesis I will depart from realist authors and argue that Czech security policy has a ‘social’ as 
well as a material basis. While realism focuses on capabilities a Constructivist tool allows one 
to look at non material factors.  Social Constructivism will not be considered a theory but 
rather a ‘ metha- theoretical approach offering an ontology that is different from rationale 
choice’.16  
Also emphasis will be given to what constitutes a threat. Indeed threat assessment is central to 
the notion of security. According to Wolfers ‘ Security in an objective sense, measures the 
absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such 
values will be attacked’. 17 Realist theories have identified different assessments of what can 
be considered as a threat, for Waltz structural position predominates, for Morgenthau state 
capacity to yield power must be considered while Walt looks at a states ‘ hostile 
intentions’While Walt departs from the materialist foundations of realism he does not 
adequately explain what shapes the perception of what constitutes of threat.  18 
In the academic debate, strategic culture plays a role as an intervening variable in foreign 
policy analysis and helps understand a states behavior in security affairs. It relevance can be 
best understood from a moderate constructivist perspective within international relations, 
which puts focus on the role of ideas, norms, identities and worldviews for understanding how 
actors interpret social reality and construct their interests in international affairs and EU 
institutions through their cognitive lenses. Strategic culture writers do not dispute material 
circumstances, such as anarchy in the International system and differences in the distribution 
of power capabilities but also suggest that these factors taken on their own are insufficient for 
understanding states’ behavior in foreign affairs. In understanding Czech threat assessment 
                                                           
16 Constructivist studies stress the importance of socially constructed meaning in International politics. Drawing 
upon the sociology of Max Weber, they assert that cultural structures (i.e. norms, identities, values) shape the 
signification actors lend to material elements.  In applying Constructivist studies to International Relations and 
more specifically security studies, Katzenstein emphasized the influence of ‘ ideational and institutional 
variables’ in shaping security interest and behavior as well as security politics. 16 
17 Wolfers: 1952  
18 Morgenthau: Politics among nations 1948, McGraw-Hill Publishers, Walt: opt cit, Waltz: opt cit 
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though one needs to take into account constructivist considerations as Czech threat 
assessment is strongly linked to its socio-historic contexts. As I will show later in this chapter 
Czech threat assessment of Russia but also its reluctance towards domination of France and 
Germany over the ESDP are strongly linked to history and the country’s perception of what 
constitutes a threat.  For example Russian actions in Europe’s greater neighborhood do not 
constitute a threat to Austria but are viewed as such by the Czech Republic. 
In order to understand why two states of similar populations and geographical location at the 
heart of Central Europe have such different perceptions of the same act one needs to take into 
account beliefs and ideational factors something which Walt and other realist theorists fall 
short on but security culture can adequately explain.   
 
2.4.  Realist Theories of Statecraft 
Although the history and the debt of gratitude towards the United States in defeating 
communism is often shared as the best explanation of Atlanticism among elites and the public 
in the Czech Republic, this thesis will take the view that this position on its own is overly 
simplistic and those not give due emphasis to pragmatic power considerations and strategic 
calculations on the part of the Czech elites. Therefore without downplaying the importance of 
history, a theoretical framework of small states and an analysis of their foreign policy 
behavior of small states  in the international system will be introduced in the beginning of this 
section as a complementary factor to understand  the strong pro American stance of CEE 
states. In doing so, the chapter will first define the concept of a small state in International 
relations. Next I will look at what foreign policy patterns of behavior are traditionally 
exhibited by small states and later try to compare them with the Czech Republic.  
 
2.4.1. What are small states in International Relations and how do they seek to maximize their 
security 
What is a small state in International Relations? 
Before beginning my analysis I feel it is important first to outline what a small state in 
International Relations is considered to be. The lack of an agreed definition of small states has 
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marked the body of literature that might be termed small state studies. 19Indeed Small states 
are defined more by what they are not (Big Powers) rather than what they are. 20  
The formalization of the categories of small versus large states stems from the historical 
experience of the 19th and 20th century when a number of small states increased dramatically 
as a consequence of breakup of empires. In the literature of international relations size has 
long been an integral and inseparable part of world politics. 21 Size is generally seen as 
directly connected to a nation’s capabilities and influence. Whilst being big is correlated with 
power, being small has been viewed as a handicap to adequate actions and even state survival. 
According to Rothstein ‘a small state is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security 
primarily by the use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of 
other states, institutions, processes or developments to do so’22  In an attempt to formulate 
‘objective’ makers of smallness references are frequently make to the absolute size of a state’s 
resources, whether in terms of size, territory, population, military capacity, etc. The 
distinction between small and large states in the European context is often referred to as the 
population of the size of the Netherlands (16 million) as a benchmark to define ‘smallness’. 
According to B Thorhallsson all states with a population above 38 million and above are 
considered as large states, and all states with a population below 16 million are considered as 
small states. 23 Czech Republic has a population of 10 million and thus can be placed in the 
small state category.  
Small states are usually depicted by the following characteristics and patterns of behavior. 
1. Low levels of overall participation in world affairs 
2. Avoidance to use force as a technique of statecraft 
                                                           
19Elman : opt cit 
20Elman, Miriam ‘ The foreign policies of small states: challenging neorealism in its own backyard’, 
21 For a classical account of small states in IR, see, Rothstein Robet. ( 1968) ‘ Alliances and Small Powers’ ( 
New York: Columbia University Press) 
22 Rothenstein: opt cit: 29  
23 Thorhallsson, Baldur ( 2006), ‘ The size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual 
Perspectives’, European Integration, 28, 7-31 
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3. Avoidance of behavior and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful states in 
the International system 
4. Frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on international issues 
5. High levels of support for international legal norms and institutions 
6. Narrow functional and geographical range of concern in foreign policy actions24 
In virtually every pattern indicated above, small states exhibit a low- profile course of 
minimum action, minimizing their perceived risk. In terms of risk, Stanley Hoffmann has 
summarized this point well: ‘At all times, the line separating smaller from larger powers has 
corresponded to two different attitudes towards risk. Small powers are forced by their 
resources, their location and the system, to be satisfied with establishing a hierarchy of risks 
and attempting to minimize the risks that they consider serious.’ 25  
 
2.4.2.  How small states seek to maximize security: Realist Alliance Theory 
In this section I will look at how small states in International Relations seek to maximise 
security in the current international system. This analysis will be dominated by alliance 
theory. Here I will first introduce the theory and later see if it has much explanatory power in 
explaining Czech Atlanticism. I will begin by outlining the main academic literature of the 
dominant realist theory on alliances with two particular theories given the most attention, 
Waltz’s balance of power and Walt’s balance of threat.  Here I will show that the realist 
theory has some explanatory with regards the actions of the Czech Republic on the 
international arena and that the strong Atlanticist orientation of the Czech Republic can be 
seen as a form of balancing against Russia but also balancing against domination of France 
and Germany over the European Union. However the weakness and the limitations of this 
theory as an explanatory of Czech Atlanticism will also be looked at. 
                                                           
24 Keohane, Robert ( 1969) ‘ Lilliputians Dilemmas: Small states in International Politics’, International 
Organisation 23-2, 291-310 
Evera, V, Stephan ( 1992), ‘ The harsh realities of International Politics’, Boston Review, Vol 17 
Katzenstein, J Peter ( 1985) ‘ Small states in World Markets’, ( Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press)  
25 Hoffman, Stanley ( 1965) ‘ The state of War’, ( New Y 
27 
 
The dominant theory of international relations is realism. Waltz description of two alliances 
behavior for great powers in the face of a threat – buck passing (loosening commitments) and 
chain ganging (tightening alliance commitments) closely reflects the decisions faced by minor 
powers. Like neutrality buck passing entails decreasing the chances of successful deterrence 
and defense in order to decrease the chance of entanglement with alliance while chain 
ganging entails increasing the chances of successful deterrence and defense at the expense of 
increasing the chances of entanglement. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder argue that 
Waltz neo-realism is insufficiently specified to predict whether buck-passing or chain ganging 
is more likely. They add a new variable to structural realism and concede that it is beliefs 
about the offence/ defense balance, a parameter clearly outside the sparse structure of 
structural realism. That determines whether chain-ganging or buck passing prevails, as 
opposed to the objective state of the defense/offence balance. 26A variant on realism that 
avoids reliance on beliefs to make predictions about alliance choice of minor powers is 
Stephan Walt’s balance of threat theory. 27 Walt explored the question of whether a state, 
when faced with an external threat, would ally against the source of the threat (balance) or 
with the source of the threat (bandwagon). Walt outlined a number of hypotheses predicting 
when states would be more likely to balance or bandwagon and found that balancing is more 
prevalent than bandwagoning. Walt also provided an answer as to why states seek to join 
alliances at all: they do so as a response to a perceived threat, since, as threat increases, the 
probability of alliance increases; and as threat decreases, the probability that new alliances 
will form decreases and the probability that existing alliances will break apart increases. 28As 
applied to the structural realist dichotomy of buck passing and chain ganging, Walt’s 
argument that threats motivate alliances implies that chain ganging dominates buck passing.  
Balancing versus Bandwagoning 
Balance of power theory has traditiponally struggled to predict whether a state should balance 
or bandwagon. ( Waltz: 1979: 190). But Waltz in his research offers a series of factors that 
can be seen as explanatory factors in explaining whether a state is more likely to adopt one of 
                                                           
26 Thomas J Christensen and Jack L. Snyder, ‘ Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: predicting Alliance patterns in 
Multipolarity, International Organisation, 33 ( Spring 1990) 
27Walt, Stephan, ‘ The origin of Alliances ( Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987) 
28Walt: opt cit: 28-30 
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these policies. For example there is a general consensus that the weaker the state the more 
likely it is to bandwagon with great powers. This is because there lack of power makes it 
unlikely that they could tilt the balance between the two groups of states.  29 Also the non 
material benefits such as status and prestige that might be powerful influences for certain 
powerful states  to choose balancing over bandwagoning are not likely to be relevant for small 
states. 30 Also the literature on small states in IR argues that small states are especially likely 
to bandwagon when a powerful state can offer economic incentives 31 This has been cited as 
being a motivation for the Czech Republic and other CEE states in joining the American 
alliance in Iraq. Many saw Czech and especially Polish participation in the stabilization 
efforts in Iraq as a way to secure substantive reconstruction contracts, and in some case 
recover debts.  However as I will show in the next chapter when I discuss the Czech Republic 
material benefits or ‘bandwagoning for profit‘ does not seem to have been a major motive for 
Czech Republic.  
Balance against regional powers 
Russia 
Czech actions  can also be seen as bandwagoning against a powerful country from outsider 
their immediate geographical area in order to balance against regional powers. 32 CEE 
bandwagoning can be viewed as a form of balancing against a Russia threat. 33 Particularly 
during the Iraq war CEE countries were certainly influenced by Russia’s decision to join 
France and Germany and not the US on the issue.  Many Central European countries were 
wary of Russia intentions towards the CEE region and Russia’s alliance with two major 
European powers was interpreted by them as potential isolation of the US in Europe. CEE 
countries feared such an aliance because in the medium and short term, it could weaken US 
willingness to remain engaged in Europe, something that the smaller states in the region could 
not accept.  
                                                           
29 Bawley: 2004: 82 
30 Ambrosio: 2005 
31 ( Schweller: 1994) 
32 Grigorescu, A : Communist and Post Communist Studies 41 ( 2008) 281-299 
33 Elkin 2003/ Budryte 2005 
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France and Germany 
Some have also interpreted Czech and Central European countries actions as a form of 
balancing against France and Germany34. Again this approach has been used to explain Czech 
and CEE states actions in siding with the US in the intra-Alliance versus intra- EU divide over 
Iraq. What is also telling is that these countries joint Western European powers such as Italy, 
Spain and the United Kingdom who similarly were not were not pleased with the overtly 
strong role played by France and Germany within the EU. It was apparent that these countries 
did not to desire to have the Franco-German axis speaking of behalf of the entire European 
Union. 35For Grigorescu Central European states also wanted to show to France and Germany 
that they were not going to be intimitated once the joined the EU, an institution percieved by 
them as being overtly dominated by  the Franco-German axis. 36 
Security Guarantees 
In explaining Czech preferences for Atlanticism over ESDP one also needs to take into 
account security guarantees for which the realist theory has much explanatory power. 
According to Grigorescu one must consider the diference between the security guarantees that 
these countries expected from the US as opposed to the teak secutity and primary economic 
benefits that they could expect from membership of the EU. Realist theories, including those 
of the balance of power, emphasise that, states will choose policies that alleviate their security 
concerns over those that bring them primary economic benefits. This suggests that when faced 
with a choice to back the NATO or the ESDP traditional balancing versus bandwagoning 
arguments would indeed have predicted that CEE countries would support the world’s sole 
remaining superpower.  
Overall we can see that realist theory has explanatory power in explaining CEE Atlanticism. 
However as will be shown in the next section one also needs to complement this with certain 
constructivist elements and take into account Ideas and perceptions in order to get a greater 
understanding.  
                                                           
34 Rhodes Matthew, ‘ Central Europe and Iraq: Balance, Badwagon or Bridge’, Orbis Volume 48, Issue 3, 
Summer 2004, 423-436 
35 Johnstone 2005; opt cit 
36 Grigorescu: opt cit: 
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2.5.  Constructivism in International Relations – additional explanatory lens 
This second half of this chapter will adapt a Constructivist theory of International Relations. 
Here I will first begin with an overview of what constructivism is and how it differentiates 
from realism.  In using a constructivist framework I do not hope to remove realism from the 
analysis but instead to complement the realist theory on threat evaluation and alliance 
building.  The great advantage of using this constructivist framework is that it allows me to 
bring in the additional understanding brought by constructivism in combination with and not 
replacing the dominant rationalist theories.  This framework will allow me to go beyond 
materialist considerations in accounting for the security interest of the Czech Republic.  
In the first chapter I outlined one of my research objectives to be to account for the Czech 
Republic’s decision to join alliances following the Cold War rather than staying neutral.  
Earlier in this chapter I gave a brief introduction to the realist theory literature on alliance and 
the entrapment versus abandonment dilemma faced by small states in decided whether to join 
alliances. In this section I will bring non materialist factors into the equation and argue that 
Czech preferences for alliances can be better explained by a learning theory framework as 
advanced by Reiter. Here I will argue that Czech alliance preferences following the Cold War 
are in accordance with the lessons drawn from their formative experiences. The theoretical 
background of Reiter’s learning theory will be given early in this section while later in the 
chapter when I discuss formative experiences in Czech Security policy I will test the theory’s 
accuracy when applied to the Czech Republic.  
 
2.5.1.  Constructivism in IR - Reiter’s learning theory  
This section will outline the theoretical basis of Reiter’s learning theory. Later in the chapter I 
will test realist predictions for alliance behavior against those of learning theory, which is 
emerging as an alternative conceptual framework to traditional realism. Whereas realism 
proposes that states ally in responses to changes in the level of external threat (Balance of 
threat), the learning theory supported in this section proposes that states ally in accordance to 
lessons drawn from their formative experiences. The evidence that will be presented later in 
this chapter will point to learning as the principal explanation of Czech Republic’s alliance 
choice, with variations in the level of external threat having only a marginal effect on alliance 
behavior.  For Czech Republic I will concentrate on two formative experiences that impacted 
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on their alliance policy the 1938 Munich Conference, the 1968 Soviet invasion with focus on 
1938.   
In order to understand the world politics question of how foreign policy is made, it is 
necessary to ask the broader social science question, how do decision makers in IIR cope with 
uncertainty? One answer to this according to Reiter is that decision makers draw experiences 
from past experiences to help cope with difficult choices. 37 The basic learning proposition of 
Reiter’s learning theory is that lessons are drawn from significant foreign policy experiences: 
continuity follows success, while innovation follows failure. According to Reiter ‘ the basic 
learning proposition is that lessons are drawn from significant foreign policy experience, 
continuity of policy follows success while innovation follows failure’38 According to Reiter’s 
model ‘ nations can draw one or two lessons from a formative event: either that neutrality best 
protects national security or alliance best protects national security’. 39  In terms of learning 
theory itself, the tendency for decision makers to learn simple lessons argues for keeping the 
set of possible lessons limited. Learners tend to keep analogies simple, the more complex the 
analogy the more difficult its application in a different context40. For example the lesson from 
the Munich Conference for the Czech Republic must be simple ‘aggressors must be opposed 
to prevent future aggression’.   
For Reiter systemic wars are the primary/ only formative events. World War 1, World War 2 
and the Cold War were the systemic wars of the modern era for which the choice of alliance 
or neutrality was most important for minor powers. However he does concede that  ‘there is 
some limited support for the proposition that great power crises can serve as formative events 
for minor powers, but the effect is not nearly as large as it is for world wars as formative 
events’ . In this research I will extend Reiter’s theory and apply it to great power crises in 
addition to systemic wars. This limited support for minor crises in very strong in the Czech 
case with some of the key formative experiences being great power crises.   
                                                           
37Reiter, Dan, opt cit,  
38Reiter, Dan, 1994, p 232 ‘ Learning from Realism, and Alliances: The weight of the Shadow of the Past’, 
World Politics 46 ( 4): 490-526 in Ingebritsen et al, Small states in International Relations, University of 
Washington Press, 2006 
39 Reiter: opt cit: pg 270 
40Reiter: opt cit:, pg 269 
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Another possibility not currently given much focus in the discourse in IR but discussed in 
Reiter's theory is that minor powers instead learn about specific nations as allies. If minor 
powers did learn about specific nations, then we would expect that from a formative 
experience they would draw lessons about which nations are the most powerful allies and 
which allies can be deemed as unreliable and untrustworthy. The impact of systemic wars and 
great power crises and the impression that they left about specific allies will be discussed later 
in the Chapter.  Here it will become apparent that past experiences have left an impression on 
the Czech elites about certain allies with distrust of major European powers to provide 
security to the continent and an overall positive impression of America.  
2.5.2. Security Culture  
Next I will move on the concept of security cultures. I will begin by giving a brief 
introduction to the subject of security cultures and how the concept of security culture can be 
used as an explanatory variable. Later in the chapter I will apply this research to the Czech 
Republic. Here I will focus on the aspects that I consider most important in accessing Czech 
Security Culture. While doing this particular attention will be given to Czech Republic’s 
history and formative experiences and how this has impacted on its current security 
preferences. Focus will also be given to geographical factors with Czech Republic’s 
geographical location at the heart of Central Europe and its close proximity to Russia. The 
concept of strategic culture also offers other major additional advantages; it allows one to 
consider changes in strategic preferences (especially through socialization). For this reason it 
has been used by several scholars in their research of ESDP and CFSP and will be used by the 
author in Chapter 4 when the impact of Europeanization on Czech Security Policy will be 
looked at.   
It is widely understood that considering the complexity of world politics, state actors 
behaviors cannot be understood just by analyzing their rational choices. According to Robert 
Keohane, ideational factors should be taken into consideration as well. Stemming from 
Keohane’s argument scholars of strategic culture seek to engage and go beyond rational 
choice analysis by reasserting the significance of cultural, ideational and normative influences 
on the motivations of states and their leaders. 41The strategic culture approach challenges the a 
                                                           
41 Keohane, Robert, ‘ After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political Economy’, Princeton, 
Guilford 1984, 73-74 cited in Coskun, Bezen Balamir, ‘ Does strategic culture matter? Old Europe, New Europe 
and Transatlantic security’, Perspectives  Autumn/ Summer 2007 
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historical, non cultural, neorealist framework for analyzing strategic choice rather than 
rejecting rationality per se as a factor in strategic choice. 42 
In his a decisive article, Jack Snyder, who is one of the first wave of strategic culture scholars 
described it as ‘ the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual 
behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or 
imitation and share with each other’. 43 The most recent wave of strategic culture scholars 
consider other aspects of state policy not just military factors. Since the late 1970s, the 
concept of strategic culture has been applied in several cases to examine the main aspects of a 
particular state’s security policies. By applying the notion of strategic culture to certain case 
studies, scholars attempt to explain contunity and change in national security policies. 
Moreover, the study of strategic culture has also been used to create a framework which can 
give answers as to why certain policy options are pursued by states. By analyzing strategic 
cultures one can understand the beliefs, attitudes, and practices regarding the use of force, 
which, though historical process, gradually evolve over time. Strategic culture analysis is 
regarded as a very analytical tool to find out the impact of values and beliefs on the foreign 
and security policies of states. 44 
It is believed that analysis of the cultural context allows one to investigate how the formative 
experiences of the state and its cultural characteristics shape strategic interests.  Strategic 
culture is shaped by formative episodes in times of crises and is influenced by past 
experience.45  Moreover it can change fundamentally or gradually overtime. Beliefs, feelings, 
fears, aims and ambitions are the unobservable aspects of each strategic culture and 
compromise the core values that give strategic culture its quality and characteristics. These 
foundational elements create each nation’s strategic culture and are derived from ‘formative 
experiences and have been internalized, creating a consensual or centripetal nature to the 
strategic culture’.  46 
                                                           
42 Coskun: opt cit: 74 
43Jack Synder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for limited nuclear operation, Santa Monica: Rand 
Publication cited in Coskun: opt cit 
44 Coskun: opt cit 73-75 
45 Cadier David: opt cit : 7-11 
46 Cadier, David: opt cit: 7-11 
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In analyzing Czech Republic relationship to Russia, the US and EU strategic culture allows 
one to account for the peculiarity of socio-historical perceptions.  In sum, it is argued by 
strategic culture scholars that strategic culture affects policy behavior by providing the 
foundations and predispositions of a state’s attitude towards particular security issues. 
Strategic culture sets the boundaries of normal behavior and provides a blueprint for the 
possible policy tools available. 47  
Before I move on to analyzing Czech strategic culture in the next section I will first give my 
definition of strategic culture which I will use throughout my analysis. Strategic culture can 
defined as ‘ socially transmitted ideas, attitudes and traditions, habits of mind, preferred 
methods of co-operation and perceptions of the International environment that are more or 
less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has a necessary 
unique historical experience’.  48 4950 Thus in plainer English, strategic culture frames both the 
perception of the threat and choice of response 
 
2.6.  Czech Security Culture 
In this section I will analyze Czech Foreign and Security policy and its orientation through the 
lens of strategic culture. In order to properly access Czech foreign and security policy it is 
important to know first where exactly to look and what variables to utilize. Security culture is 
beneficial in this respect in that it is an openly fluid concept thus allowing the author to 
include norms, ideas and perceptions in the analysis and come up with one own variables 
which explain Czech security. In this section I produce three core variables which when 
                                                           
47Longhurst and Zaborowski: 2005: 7  
48Gray, Colin ( 1999), ‘ Strategic Culture as Context: The first generation of theory strikes Back’, International 
Affairs, Vol 25 ( 1), 49-69   
Gray’s definition does not include ‘national policymakers perceptions of the international environment’.  This 
thesis will follow the lead of Giegerich 2006  in European Security and Strategic Culture: 2006 and supported by 
Cadier (2008) which includes ‘ national policymakers perceptions of the international environment’ in the 
analysis.  
49 Giergerich, Bastien, European Security and Strategic Culture, Nomos Verlagsgesellscaft, 2006  
50 The Czech Republic does not have a united full blown security culture in that the security community is 
relativly new ( 20 years) and that a consensus is not shared among the general population.  However within the 
security community there is a general  consensus both on the percieved threat and also the agreed response to 
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combined with rationalist realist theories based on power are most important variables in 
explaining the orientation of Czech Security policy from 1989 until the present. The first and 
most important variable looked will be history. Here I will show how a history of occupation 
by foreign powers has impacted on the thinking of Czech elites. Attention here will be given 
to the formative moments in Czech history and the lesson that was learned from these 
experiences. As will be shown a strong correlation can certainly be identified between history 
and Czech security policy post 1989. The next factor looked at will be geography and the geo-
political context of being a small state surrounded by small states in Central Europe. This 
factor overlaps with history but is also a major determinant. Here I will show that Czech 
Republic due to its geographical proximity to Russia has a great fear of Russia, a major 
motivation behind Its Atlanticist orientation. Also important to consider is Czech skepticism 
towards Europe and the ESDP which is linked to the fear historical that Central Europe is a 
playing ground for the larger powers and that the European project will become to overtly 
dominated by the larger European states of France and Germany. Here the Atlanticist 
orientation and preference for allying with an ally 3,000 kilometers away can be explained by 
geo-historical factors and kind of balancing against Russia and the strong European states. 
The final variable looked at will be the Czech domestic political setting. This will involve a 
discourse on the main political parties but also a look at the institutional setting such as the 
influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense. Also reviewed will be public 
opinion and the Czech electoral system.   51 
Czech Republic A reversed security culture? 
For some security culture scholars such as Meyer security culture implies that the sentiment is 
shared among the broader population however in Czech Republic it is more accurate to say 
there exists a reverse security culture. By this we can see that there is a relatively small group 
of people the security elite, either politicians or security experts, who form security policy and 
shape the broader strategic culture according to this.  
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Chart 1 - Map of Czech Security Culture - a further explanation is given in the Appendix B 
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3.6.1.  History, formative and normative experiences 
 ‘In Central Europe, perceptions of history, its public role and functions are marked by 
historicism, propensity to project the present into the past, to see history as a weight in the 
present that obscures prima facie inappropriate historical precedents, and to assume that 
answers to the present will be found in the past, that the present is best understood through the 
past’. 52  
Historically the Czech Republic has been dominated by larger more powerful neighbors, first 
by the Habsburg Empire of Austria then in the 20th century by Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union. Until 1989 the only modern experience of independent statehood came in the interwar 
period, 1918-1938, when a democratic Czechoslovak Republic was created from the ruins of 
the Austro-Hungarian empire and then  again briefly after WW2, from 1945 until Communist 
rule in 1948. The legacy of external domination was then reinforced by Warsaw pact military 
intervention to crush the ‘Prague Spring’ reform movement in 1968. In origins of the alliances 
Alexandr Vondra and Ronald Asmus argue that the Atlanticism of CEE countries originates in 
a specific set of historical experiences these countries have had with the United States over 
the past century. 53 The articles emphasize on history as an important explanatory variable has 
been supported by qualitative interviews and my review of relevant literature and has much 
explanatory power for Czech Republic.54 Of these formative experiences the ones which I 
have chosen to focus on will be the creation of the Czech state, Czech encounters with both 
the NAZI and Communist totalitarian regimes, the recognition of the leading role played by 
the US in toppling Communism and in facilitating the integration of these countries into Euro-
Atlantic Institutions. Thus as a dateline the years 1918, 1938, 1968 and the 1989-1999 period 
will be reviewed. In looking at these years I will first give a brief background on the event in 
question, on the lesson learned from that event and on how this event impacts on the 
preferences of today’s Czech security policy. 55 
                                                           
52 Schopfin, G Central Europe: Defintion Old and New. In search of a Central Europe, ed. By George Schoplin 
and Nancy Wodd. Cambride: Polity 1989 
53Vondra, Alexandr and Asmus, Ronald, D ‘ The origins of the atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe’, 
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54 Rather than focus on the Czech Republic the article refers to the entire Central European region 
55 Strangely, in those years ending in 8, 1918, 1938, 1948 and 1968 the Czech people strove either to gain, 
maintain or regain their independence.  
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2.6.1.1.    1918: Creation of the Czechoslovak State 
Background 
In 1918 the Czechoslovak state was created out of the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  
For almost 400 years56 the Czech people had been living under the rule of foreign occupiers 
under the form of the Austro-Hungarians. The Czechoslovak state became part of the 
Habsburg Empire in 1526 with the Czechs attempting to defend their privileges and 
independence against the Habsburgs, who sought to transform the lands they ruled into a 
centralized and absolute Catholic monarchy. 57 This provoked the Czech nobility’s rebellion 
in 1618 and at the battle of White Mountain in 1620 the Czechs were severely defeated. One 
of the most important causes of the defeat was insufficient support from abroad. 58 Following 
the Battle of White Mountain the Czech lands gradually became a province of the Hapsburg 
Empire and their security depended on the foreign policy made in Vienna, on which the 
Czechs had no influence.  
In 1914 World War 1 broke out with the Czechs a member of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
they had no option but to side with the German – Austro-Hungarian alliance. Czechs rejected 
the idea of further Germanisation of their lands and began to struggle for complete 
independence from the Habsburg Empire and the creation of an independent Czech state. 
Thomas Masaryk launched himself into the campaign for Czech independence at the 
beginning of the war with the objective being the creation of a common Czech and Slovak 
state, to be called Czechoslovakia. 59 The existence of the new Czechoslovakia state was to be 
based on a new system of International Relations and relied on the victory of the Entente 
powers.  
For Czechoslovakia the creation of Poland and Yugoslavia would be significant with 
Czechoslovakia connecting their own security with their neighborhood. Thus Czechoslovakia 
wanted to have a common border with Poland and Yugoslavia.60 For Czechoslovakia it was 
also significant that other small nationalities like themselves would receive their 
                                                           
56 Czech Republic become part of the Austrian empire in 1526 
57 Vesely: opt cit: 681 
58 Vesely: opt cit: 681 
59 Vesely: opt cit: 682 
60 Unterberger, Betty Miller, The United States, revolutionary Russia and the rise of Czechoslovakia, University 
of North Carolina Press, 1989  
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independence. During the War the Czechoslovak foreign resistance had attempted to 
contribute militarily to the Entente’s victory. The Czechoslovak legion which by the end of 
the war numbered 90,000 men was formed and fought alongside allied powers in the War. 61 
It is important to also take into consideration that the Czechoslovak state was declared in 
Washington and came about largely as a result of US President Woodrow Wilson’s 
determination to have ‘self determination for all nations’. Indeed Vondra and Asmus profess 
that ‘without Woodrow Wilson’s idealism and activism, Czechoslovakia would never have 
gained independence at least not in 1918’ 62 Thomas Masaryk the founding father of the 
Czech state 63 was a regular visitor the United States during the war.  He also married an 
American and from his viewpoint saw the US as an important protector of the smaller nations 
such as Czechoslovakia in their fight against domination by foreign powers. In his book ‘The 
makings of a state’ Masaryk wrote ‘‘The American state is different from the European states 
programme inherited from the institutions of the old regime… I devoted much time thinking 
to the idea that the Czechoslovak state would resemble America in that we too have no 
dynasty of our own and dislike foreign dynasty’. 64  
Lesson 
• America a liberator and promoter of democracy in Czech eyes 
1918 was important in so far as in Czech eyes America came to be seen as a liberator rather 
than an oppressor. Woodrow Wilson’s determination to have ‘self determination for all 
nations’ created a positive impression of the United States who came to be seen as a protector 
and defender of small nations.  This is in contrast to European powers with which Czech 
people had just spent 400 years under foreign occupation. This negative impression of 
European powers was further embedded in the national consciousness in 1938 and 1968 when 
I discuss Czech experiences in these formative periods. Also this positive impression of 
America as a liberator rather than an oppressor has lasted to a certain extent until the present 
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63 Masaryk is largely considered as a hero to the Czech people, In a poll conducted in 2005 by Czech TV and 
which garned 68,000 votes he was voted as second greatest Czech of all time, 
http://www.radio.cz/en/article/67495 
64 Diary of Thomas Masaryk cited in Vondra and Asmus: opt cit 
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day and will be seen when we discuss Czech motivations for having the US place their missile 
radar base here. 65 In the discourse on the radar those on the pro-radar side were keen to point 
out that America unlike the ‘other powers’ has never had hegemonic ambitions in Czech 
Republic. America  and the image of America in Czech Republic as a democracy committed 
to promoted democratic values has resulted in a positive image of itself.  Although this is 
partly due to its geographical location 3,000 km from the Czech Republic it is also because 
America helped create the Czech state and has never had any imperialistic ambitions in the 
region.  
• Sovereignty can be achieved with support of the major powers 
1918 also showed to Czech elites that sovereignty can be achieved with the aid of great 
powers. It showed that with the right support from another state sovereignty and 
independence is possible. Czech’s Atlanticist orientation post 1989 has an element of this 
thinking, with elements determined to preserve Czech sovereignty keen to ally and gain 
support of the world’s major power. (US). ‘The fact that Masaryk went to America during the 
war shows something. Why did he go there? He had to think that the America regime was 
somehow going to help to work towards an Independent Czechoslovakia and it did help 
because America immediately did recognize free Czechoslovakia in 1918 so of course you 
can draw parallels between 1918 and now’.  66 
2.6.1.2. Munich 1938 :Abandoned by its allies 
Background  
At the Munich Conference on September 29th, 1939 the representatives of Great Britain, 
Germany, Britain, France and Italy decided that in the interests of preserving peace 
Czechoslovakia should surrender in the border regions. In March 1939 Hitler forced Slovakia 
to declare independence. He then immediately ordered the occupation of the Czech lands and 
annexed them as a protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.67 The Western powers, which had 
guaranteed the continued existence of the remains of Czechoslovakia after the Munich 
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66 Interview: Marat Neuman, May 15th 2010 
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agreement, betrayed the country a second time when their only reaction to Hitler’s latest 
aggression was to protest. 
Lesson 
• Keep American commitments to Europe alive and credible 
In Western European elites and the general public often suggest that the continent is exposed 
too much to American influence and domination. This view is not shared in the Czech 
Republic and can be traced back to the interwar period and America’s withdrawal from 
Europe and move towards isolationism. Vondra and Asmus reflect that ‘Many Czech’s look 
back at their experience in the 20th century and especially 1938 and conclude that the 
problems they faced were the result of too little as opposed to too much America’. 68  In their 
article they state that ‘It was with greater regret and trepidation that Czech and Central 
European leaders and diplomats watched American withdrawal from European politics in the 
1930s, leaving them to fend for themselves against the backdrop of depression, rising 
nationalism and predatory geopolitics. In Central European eyes, it was America’s retreat 
from European politics in the 1920s that paved the way for the rise of Hitler and Stalin and 
eventual destruction of their independence’. 69 
Today for Atlanticists only a solid link and credible commitment on the part of the United 
States provides Czech Republic and the other CEE countries with a strong sense of security, 
something confirmed by a statement by former Polish President Kwasniewski  (1997)‘With 
Poland’s history in mind, in particular the historical experience connected with the causes and 
the courses of both world wars, we oppose attempts to marginalize the presence of the United 
States in the process of European unification. It is in this sense that we shall pursue our policy 
within the region and outside it… the two world wars proved to the peoples of Europe and 
American that without a US presence in Europe, European security is unlikely to be 
achieved’. 70 
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This can explain the strong preference of the Czech Republic for maintaining an American 
military presence in Europe something which will be looked at in more detail when I discuss 
the Czech motivations behind placing the radar base in Czech Republic and concerns over 
Obama’s ‘ reset strategy’. Indeed the primary objective of Czech Security policy today as 
stated in my hypothesis in Chapter 3 is to keep American commitments to Europe alive and 
credible.  
• Maintain credible alliances that cannot be broken 
The failure of the little Entente and the League of Nations to protect the Czechoslovak 
territory showed the importance of being part of credible alliances for the Czech Republic. It 
also showed the weaknesses of international organizations to provide security. While the 
League of Nations spoke about maintaining peace throughout the world in reality it lacked the 
military instruments and will to do so without the United States and with limited commitment 
from other powers. For Jiri Schneider of the Prague Institute of Security Studies the main 
lesson from 1938 was pretty simple ‘you better be part of a credible alliance, not to be left 
alone’. 71 Interviews with officials inside the Ministry of Defense give further backing to 
Schneider’s comments with one official stating ‘the lesson of 1938 was to seek alliances 
which can’t be broken’. 72 
Since 1989 the Czech Republic has made great efforts to maintain alliances and keep them 
credible.  Bi-laterally there is a great effort to ensure that the bi-lateral relations with US 
cannot be broken the way relations akin to the Little Entente 1938. This will be looked at in 
more detail in the next chapter through a case study of the missile defense system but the 
basic premise is that if an important ally asks for a favour there is no reason to say no. 
Similarly although the Czech public are no great supporters of out of area missions far away 
from the Czech homeland a feeling remains that this missions are an important way in which 
to keep the NATO alliance credible.   
Czech Republic’s strong attachment towards NATO can be seen in Article 20 of the Czech 
Security Strategy which states ‘NATO remains the core security organization in the Euro-
Atlantic area. It embodies the transatlantic link that plays an indispensible role in Euro-
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Atlantic security and stability’.73 While its commitment to keeping the alliance credible can 
be seen in Article 11 ‘The Czech Republic has undertaken to improve its defense capabilities 
as part of the alliances commitment to enhance and develop its military capabilities. To this 
end, the Czech Republic is gradually building a fully professional, highly mobile, and flexible 
army with modern equipment, capable of participating in a broad range of Alliance missions 
and other international operations, including operations conducted outside the Czech 
Republic’s territory’. This approach is based on the unquestionable value of collective defense 
and co-operative security provided by international organizations and multilateral 
arrangements. For Czech Republic the pillar of collective defense is NATO’74 
• Do not rely on European powers alone 
During this period the Czechoslovaks were very much left down by fellow European powers. 
France unsuccessfully attempted to stand up to Hitler’s increasing aggression by working with 
the USSR to create a collective security policy. Under the influence of Great Britain however 
France eventually chooses a policy of concessions towards Hitler. Both France and Great 
Britain reckoned that Hitler could be satisfied and another world war thereby averted. Thus a 
policy of appeasement towards Hitler was pursued by the European powers at the 
Czechoslovaks expense.  
The experience of 1938 has made Czech Republic very skeptical about Western Europe’s 
willingness to defend the other Europe without material help and moral pressure from the 
United States. What is also notable about 1938 is that it formed a negative conception of 
certain European allies and a mistrust of the ability of European powers to defend the Czech 
Republic against invasion by foreign powers. For Nick Hynek 1938 created a certain mistrust 
towards certain European countries  ‘These are discursive moments saying that you can’t trust 
certain countries and you need to be careful of whom to trust because of experiences, by this I 
refer especially to Britain and France’.75 While Czech Republic there is in no sense any 
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hostility towards France or Britain there is an underlying sentiment that certain powers cannot 
be trusted in the realm of hard security. 76 
• Do not rely on Multilateral Institutions or International Law for your security 
While Czech Republic is a great supporter of the United Nations and international institutions 
it also recognizes the weaknesses of these institutions in the military realm and thus places 
great emphasis on gaining protection from America, either through bi-lateral relations or 
through the NATO framework. German occupation of Czech territory came despite great 
efforts to preserve their state following independence. Multi-lateral relations were one of the 
main methods used to ensure the security of the Czechoslovak state. The main architect of the 
country’s foreign policy the foreign policy minister Edward Benes was aware that the states 
security was dependent on the larger system of International Relations.77 Therefore ever since 
its accession he was an active member of the League of Nations, an international organization 
setup to act as a guarantee of peace and security. Czechoslovak sought to improve its position 
in the International system through active engagement and activity in the League of Nations.78 
Benes believed that for small states the most effective means to ensure security was through 
the League of Nations.  Today Czech Republic supports multi-lateral institutions such as the 
UN and believes they provide a good framework to work towards the prevention of security 
threats such as weapons disbarment however it is unwilling to rely on these institutions for its 
security.   
• Deal with threats at an early stage 
A further defining tenet of Czech security culture, is a disposition of favoring pro-active 
engagement. Again this is rooted in history and derives from an enduring facet of Czech 
identity as being victims of Western European pacifism (French and British appeasement 
towards Hitler and the concessions made to Hitler at the Munich Conference). As a result 
there is a preference for dealing with perceived military threats in their early stages and at a 
great distance from Czech territory. The rationale of this according to Khol this is based ‘on 
the conviction and historical experience that they may materialize sooner or later and that a 
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good mix of defensive and offensive measures should be directed against them’ 79 This 
disposition directly influences current Czech policy and was a factor behind Czech support for 
NATO action in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and also it’s active policy towards its Eastern 
neighborhood.  
• Fear of being excluded from crucial decisions  
At the Yalta Conference the Czech Republic and other CEE states were largely ignored with 
Stalin and the allied powers agreeing to divide up the European continent. For Marcin 
Zabrowski WW2 and the Yalta Conference left an ‘indelible impression’ on the Central 
European states and a fear of being excluded from crucial decisions. 80 
• Revisiting Reiter: Biggest Lesson of 1938: Alliance not neutrality 
As Reiter’s theory at the beginning of the chapter argues states continue policies of success 
and change policies of failure. Czech Republic’s preference for an alliance can be traced by to 
its formative experience in 1938 when it’s purely defensive policy failed to protect 
Czechoslovakia from Nazi Germany. For Khol Czech Republic’s decision to reject neutrality 
as an option post 1989 can be traced back to 1938 ‘Both the concrete historical experience, 
and comparative examples of the neutral status of several European states being easily 
violated both during the first and second world war, bode ill for the neutral policy option, 
which has no viable tradition here (Czech Republic)’. 81 
Conceptually this approach is well expressed in the following relevant passage in the Security 
Strategy of the Czech Republic  
‘The security policy of the Czech Republic emancipates from the principle of the indivisibility 
of security. The Czech Republic’s security is inseparable from that of the Euro-Atlantic 
region and the global security situation. Therefore a permanent interest of the Czech Republic 
                                                           
79 Khol: opt cit: 473 
80 What is also telling about the 1938 experience is that it overshadowed the Yalta experience when Czech 
Republic was overlooked by America as a pawn in the broader go-political game between America and the 
Soviet Union. At Yalta Conference in 1945 America failed to stand up for the Czech Republic and CEE states 
and de facto accepted the Soviet sphere of influence in Central Europe. Yet despite this as Vondra and Asmus 
conclude that ‘ America was nonetheless seen as a benign and positive force….T he bitterness of Yalta in 1945 
was still somehow overpowered by the bitterness of Munich and a memory of betrayal by former allies in 1938’ 
81 Khol: opt cit : 473 
46 
 
is the maintenance of an effective role for the United Nations and the strengthening of unity in 
the Euro-Atlantic security sector. The Czech Republic cannot be indifferent to the fate of 
other peoples, countries and regions, and therefore it is prepared, in accordance with its 
capabilities and international partnership to work for the resolution of security problems to 
mitigate their consequences’82 
Learning theory is a better explanatory of Czech Alliance policy post 1989 than balance of 
threat. Balance of threat theory focuses on short term reactions to changes in the international 
environment, while learning theory explains how long term ideas about grand strategy are 
formulated. After a formative event, learning theory predicts that a state that has learned a 
lesson favoring alliance would prefer alliance with a great power even if there is no current 
threat to the international environment, because such an orientation is in accord with a broad 
belief in utility of alliance in dealing with threats when they arrive. 83  This is reflective of the 
Czech post Cold war situation when Czech elites immediately pushed for inclusion into 
NATO. This can be seen as part of a broader belief among Czech elites that their security 
interests are best protected as part of an alliance that is credible. NATO with its article V 
security guarantee provided this. Also it is important to consider that Russia actions had little 
impact of this way of thinking as it was part of a broader goal of gaining accession to 
alliances. In response to this balance of threat advocates might say because different states 
have different views on how to address future threats, then this would beg the question of 
where these different views come from, which learning theory answers by proposing the past 
experiences determine how states come to view the best way of dealing with future threats. In 
Czech Republic’s accession to NATO it is noteworthy that the country’s entry did not come 
under the pressure of an immediate threat to its existence but still pushed hard for accession. 
2.6.1.3. 1968 – Invaded by a former ally 
Background 
In 1968 the Communist regime began to democratize conditions in Czechoslovakia. The 
programme was intended to be a path out of the regime’s crises and simultaneously an attempt 
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to end a non-Soviet model of socialism. 84 On the night of August 20-21 1968, the military 
forces of five Warsaw Pact countries invaded Czechoslovakia. Although the Western nations 
officially and publically condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia they essentially 
accepted it as a fait accompli and considered it largely an Eastern bloc internal matter. M 
Couvre de Murville, French Prime Minister described the invasion as ‘a small incident on the 
way to détente’. 85As Vesely ferments ‘ there was a bitterly ironic parallel between the years 
1938 and 1968…in the former year Czechoslovak’s allies abandoned it, in the latter they 
attacked and occupied it’ 86 
Lesson 
• Be part of a democratic alliance 
In 1968 Czech Republic was invaded by its former ally. The lesson to be gathered from this 
was that you better be part of a democratic security alliance like NATO and make efforts to 
keep it credible.87  Similarly interviews inside the Ministry of Defense would confirm this 
theory with one of the interviewees responding ‘the big lesson of 1968 is that the Czech 
Republic must make every effort to ensure that this never occurs again’.  
 
This experience is manifested today in Czech preferences for promoted democracy across the 
globe. This foreign policy thinking of promoting democracy and human right can be seen in 
the Czech Republic security policy post 1989 (Especially under the Presidency of Vaclav 
Havel) and can be linked to this formative experience and period in Czech history. Soon after 
becoming President Havel emphasized human rights and democracy promotion principles as 
one the pillars which Czech Foreign and Security Policy should be based on.   
‘Many years of living under communism gave us certain experiences that the non communist 
West (fortunately) did not have to go through. We came to understand (or to be precise some 
of us did) that the only genuine values are those which one is capable, if necessary, of 
sacrificing something. The traditional values of Western civilization – such as democracy, 
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respect for human rights and the order of nature, the freedom of the individual, and the 
inviolability of his property, the feeling of co-responsibility for the world, which means the 
awareness that if freedom is threatened anywhere, it is threatened everywhere- all of these 
things become values with moral, and therefore metaphysical, underpinnings. Without 
intending to, the communists taught us to understand the truth of the world not as a mere 
information about it, but as an attitude, a commitment and a moral imperative’ 8889 
The Czech Republic’s is a very active promoter of human rights across the globe.   The Czech 
Republic’s active approach can be seen in its criticism of human rights violations of Cuba in 
the UN and in its approach towards Belarus.  
 
2.6.1.4. 1989-1999 Fall of Communism and integration into Euro-Atlantic 
 Institutions 
Background 
• 1989 - 1992 Fall of Communism 
In 1989 Gorbachev began a policy of perestroika. Soon the Communist regimes in the CEE 
region began to fall down. The Velvet Revolution of November 1989 ended Communist rule 
in Czechoslovakia and launched Czechoslovakia on the road to democracy.  In particular 
America rather than Western Europe was accredited with bring down communism. 
Specifically the emphasis placed on human rights under Jimmy Carter and the rhetoric and 
military buildup of Ronald Reagan are seen as the core causes. As Vondra states ‘If you ask 
West Europeans who deserves credit for bringing down communism they will likely name 
Gorbachev or Brandt while leaders in Czech Republic and CEE, will point to two American 
president Jimmy Carter and Ronald Regan’.90 91 
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Also in the debate over which methods to use in bringing down Communism the American 
preference for supporting opposition groups and placing pressure on communist governments 
proved a much more successful approach than the Western European governments who opted 
for engagement. The support for the US style of supporting opposition leaders and putting 
emphasize on human rights can be seen once again in the Czech Republic’s strong approach 
towards Belarus.  
Lesson 
• Return to the West- Retrieving Western Identity 
Immediately after the collapse of Communism the primary aim of the Czech Republic was a 
return to West.  In this ‘Return to the West’ it is important to note that Czech Republic and 
other CEE countries always viewed NATO and the EU as complement and never in 
competition. In the Czech Republic at the time of integration the description of the primary 
foreign policy goal was integration into ‘Euro-Atlantic’ structures, which basically meant the 
twin goal of acceding to both the EU and NATO without hierarchy. NATO because of its 
focus on military structure has never been seen as an alternative to the EU but rather as a 
complement to it. From the point of view of the Czech Republic NATO was to be in charge of 
hard security, while the EU focuses on economic matters.  
Thus historically Czech Republic never faced a dilemma of having to choose between 
Western Europe and the US. According to Lukac and Gyarfosova ‘For Central European 
countries, the classic dilemma throughout modern history has always been one of ‘the West or 
the East’92. For Czech Republic and CEE countries the East was represented by Russia which 
was largely viewed as authoritarian and imperialistic. The West was not viewed merely in 
geographical terms but more represented the idea of ‘Europe’ which they saw as a united, 
prosperous and secure.  In the Interwar period Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy orientation 
was according to Hahn ‘an expression of its cultural solidarity with the Western civilization’ 
93 
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With the emergence of the ESDP  the perception remained that NATO should focus on hard 
security areas while Europe can serve a function as a soft power working on Civilian areas. 
This Czech views of the two organizations as complementary remains today and can be seen 
in Article 40 of the Czech Security strategy ‘ The Czech Republic seeks to enhance the 
transatlantic link, it this context it supports the complementary development of the capabilities 
of NATO and the EU. It also stresses the need to strengthen the NATO/ EU partnership as the 
backbone of Euro-Atlantic security architecture’. 94 
 
The existence of these twin goals plays a crucial role in examining the transatlantic dimension 
of foreign policy adjustment. It was one of the key factors in describing the foreign policy of 
the EU countries as ‘Atlanticist’. Precisely because NATO and EU accession were viewed as 
complementary and equally important in the 1990s, it was difficult for the political elites that 
supported both processes to recognize possible controversies between them. The question that 
will be looked at from now is whether a foreign policy consensus exists today after the twin 
goals of Euro-Atlantic integration have been achieved? Having returned to the West are 
NATO and ESDP still seen as entirely complementary. The future of NATO and the ESDP as 
two competing or complementary organizations will be looked at in more detail in the final 
chapter.  
 
2.6.1.5 .    1993-1999 Integration into Euro-Atlantic Institutions 
Background 
After 1989 Czechoslovakia had to fundamentally alter its approach to maintaining security as 
almost overnight it had left its membership in the old Communist bloc. The aim was set that 
being integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. NATO was given priority with the idea of 
neutrality never considered.  Czechoslovakia did not favor a Central European regional 
security organization in concert with Hungary and Poland.  
The inclinations of many democratic leaders to CEE to look towards the US for security were 
reinforced by experience of these countries in the 1990s with NATO and EU and the 
contrasting positions of the US compared to some of the major European powers. France 
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especially was reluctant with French President Mitterrand commented in that he thought it 
would be ‘decades and decades’ before CEE could join EU, created shock.  In 1991 he 
proposed a plan for a European Confederation as a way to keep Prague or Warsaw out of EU 
core, was met with resentment. 95’ Europe turned out to be quite reluctant, it took four years 
and the Copenhagen Conference until Czech Republic saw any real commitment and even 
then the criteria set was quite strict’. 96 
In contrast the Czech Republic found great support in Washington in its overarching goal to 
integrate into Euro-Atlantic Institutions.  Within Washington there was a strong lobby 
(especially strong in the Polish case) among both Democrats and Republicans pushing for the 
countries of the CEE region to be integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions.97 Strong personal 
connections between leaders on both sides of the Atlantic were also a big factor with strong 
personal relationships between American President Bill Clinton, the Czech born Madeline 
Albright (At the time US ambassador to the United States and later US Secretary of State) and 
Czech President Vaclav Havel. For Schneider the importance of personalities and friendships 
during this period should not be downplayed  ‘ Personalities matter…What made US to open 
NATO would end up in very important impulse from Havel towards Clinton- Clinton came 
back from a  meeting  ( in Washington Holocaust museum) and said we should let them 
in…Of course in Washington helpful.. Of course Albright was helpful but personalities matter 
and you have to pull strings’98 
Lesson  
• America a champion of the Czech cause 
As a formative period 1993 – 1999 was very influential. Czech leaders and the general public 
viewed America as once again the champion of their cause, standing up to Russia pressure 
and overcoming reluctance of Western Europe.  For Khol the current preferences of Czech 
Security policy are rooted in this period ‘ the current preferences of the Czech republic in 
security and defense policy are clearly determined by the formative experience of its 
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aspirations for NATO membership in the 1993-1999 period, the actual evolution of the 
Alliances stance on this issue and the strong attached to the US, including its top politicians 
such as Bill Clinton and Secretary of State….The conduct of the NATO enlargement process 
therefore contributed to the self declared belonging of the Czech Republic to the informal pro-
Atlanticist group both in the Alliance and in Europe as a whole’. 99 Khol further elaborates 
that the Czech Atlanticist leaning is strongly linked to this period ‘In many issues of the Intra 
Alliance debate Prague could be counted on to support the pro-Atlanticist viewpoint, partially 
as a result of a combination brought about as a result of its interest in a vibrant Atlantic 
alliance based on a continued American military presence in mainland Europe, and its 
gratitude for the role played by the US in bringing about NATO enlargement’. 100 
While Germany initially raised the issue of NATO enlargement from the period 1993-1999 it 
was an issue dominated by the US.  As Vondra and Asmus highlight it was America who 
pushed the issue ‘Washington became a driving force both politically and intellectually in 
overcoming opposition and moving the alliance to open its doors to new members  as well as 
to embrace a robust open door policy to ensure the enlargement would continue in spite of 
strong Russian opposition’. 101 This strong American leadership on NATO issue also put 
pressure on EU to keep pace.   
All those interviewed agreed that EU membership which came in 2004 would not have come 
about without joining NATO in 1999. Similarly the consensus among Czech leaders was that 
EU accession would never have come about without NATO accession. While it may appear 
that the two organizations worked in co-ordination, the reality was the EU proved to be much 
more hesitant while NATO was determined to take concrete steps toward European 
unification in the EU. 102 This greater determination is largely attributed to the United States.   
• Atlanticism can transcend  geo-political dilemma of living in central Europe 
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In reflecting on the lessons Czech Republic has learned over the past 100 years Asmus and 
Vondra lament ‘History thought us never be caught in a dark alley between Russia and 
Germany or rely on France or UK for national salvation’ 103 In this sense Atlanticism also 
offered the Czech Republic the opportunity to escape geographical burdens that had plagued 
the country of the past 100 years.  For the Czech Republic America was considered the only 
reliable actor to be able to keep in check German Central European ambitions and from 
dissuading Russia from having territorial ambitions in the region.  Also the Czech Republic 
due to its size is reconciled to the notion that it is unable to provide its own security but if they 
must accept a hegemony in the International system their preference is for a hegemony that is 
not a nearby state. ‘Thanks to American leadership they were able to transcend the dilemma 
of living in a geo-political no-man’s land between Germany and Russia and obtain the same 
level of security taken for granted in Western Europe’. ‘ 
As shown previously security cultures are subject to change. One area where Czech security 
culture has undergone a major shift is in its perceptions of Germany. According to Eva Hahn 
a Czech Historian ‘From the Czech viewpoint, the position of Germany on Czech maps of 
Europe represent a bigger problem than their own placement there’. 104 However over the last 
20 years Czech Republic has largely come to terms with the German question a process 
strongly aided by European integration. This perception of Germany has changed over the last 
20 years however and the feeling that Germany as a threat that needs to be balanced against 
no longer exists.  Increasingly today the Czech Republic is viewing Germany as a partner 
rather than a competitor.  Indeed in my case studies there is little to no evidence of Czech 
actions been representative of the Czech Republic somehow viewing Germany as a threat. 
Also Germany was a great supporter of Czech integration into NATO in the 1990s and 
proposed this; while America is remember as the power that pushed forward the accession 
process the support from Germany has not been forgotten.  Although elements of Euro 
skepticism remain in the Czech Republic especially within the ODS party and best manifested 
by the attitudes of Czech president Klaus this sentiment is more reflective of concern about 
the course of European integration rather than seeing Germany as a threat with hegemonic 
ambitions in the Czech Republic.  
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• 2009 Obama’s Reversal on Missile Defence and ‘ reset’ strategy with Russia 
105 In 2009 the Obama administration cancelled a proposed planned missile defense project, a 
reversal on the Bush administration’s policy. The background to this, whether it can be 
considered a formative experience and if so what are the lessons learned will be looked at in 
my Chapter 4. 
 
2.6.2.  Geographical position  
The geographical position of Czech Republic at the heart of Central Europe and surrounded 
by great powers has a major impact on its security preferences. To properly understand the 
difference of Czech security culture with that of the Western powers one needs to take into 
account geographical factors. Geographical factors are intrinsically intertwined with historical 
factors. The Czech Republic’s position between Germany and Russia/ Soviet Union has in the 
past 100 years been a source of threat to the Czech state and the cause of two invasions of 
Czech territory, 1938 and 1968. This turbulent history coupled with its position as a small 
state sandwiched between larger states means that Czech security policy remains concerned 
with territorial defense.  
Lesson of geography 
• Strong attachment towards territorial defense. 
In terms of strategic culture the Czech Republic due to its geographical location and historical 
experience of invasion can be seen to have a strong attachment towards territorial defense 
something shared by all CEE states. In terms of territorial defense the Czech Republic is not 
ready to rely on international institutions or weak defensive organizations such as the ESDP 
for its protection, given the poor track record of these organizations in the key formative 
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events of 1938 and 1968, when the sovereignty of the Czech Republic was threatened by Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union.  Institutions such as the League of Nations and the present 
United Nations are strongly supported but are seen as being ineffective in preventing 
conflicts. As result of its attachment to territorial defense there remains a strong preference in 
Czech Republic for an American led NATO, which is prepared to execute article V of the 
treaty in the event of an attack. Czech attachment towards territorial defense is linked to 
Czech perceptions of Russia as a threat. This threat perception will now be looked at.  
Impact of Geographical Proximity to Russia – Perceptions of Russia threat 
In this section I will look at Czech perceptions of Russia as a threat however before I do this I 
first would like to outline the divergent approaches among European member states over 
whether Russia constitutes a threat and also how best to deal with Russia ( Engagement or 
Containment) and also Russia’s divergent approaches towards ‘ Old’ and ‘New’ member 
states and its actions in its ‘near abroad’.   
Contrasting East West Approaches towards Russia 
The question of how to deal with Russia has replaced relations with US as the most divisive 
issue among European states and one in which we see great divergence among member states. 
In a comprehensive report of each countries relations towards Russia Leonard and Popescu 
referred to Russia as the ‘new Rumsfeld’. 106 The deeper meaning behind the term not only 
lies behind Rumsfeld assertion during the lead up to the Iraq war but also reflects how the 
divide over the Russian issue draws similar parallels between  ‘old’ and ‘ new’ Europe.  
During the 1990s the EU members generally agreed on a common approach to Russia and 
they developed a strategy of democratizing and Westernizing Russia. However today this 
common strategy no longer exists. Furthermore the divisions between the EU members over 
Russia are much more complex than a split between old and new member states. The 
European Council of Foreign Relations ( ECPR) report entitled ‘ Power audit of EU 27 – 
Russian relations’ shows that the EU is split in two approaches: At one end of the spectrum 
are those who view Russia as a potential partner that can be drawn into the EU’s orbit through 
a process of ‘creeping integration’. At the other end are member states that see and treat 
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Russia as a threat. According to them, Russian expansionism and contempt for democracy 
must be rolled back through a policy of ‘ soft containment’ that involves excluding Russia 
from the G8, expanding NATO to include Georgia, supporting anti-Russian regimes in the 
neighborhood, building missile shields, developing an  ‘Energy NATO’ and excluding 
Russian investment from the European energy sector. 107  
In Leonard and Popescu’s report they identified 5 distinct groups who all had different 
approaches towards Russia.  The Czech Republic is identified as a ‘frosty pragmatist’ who 
focus on business interests but are less afraid than others to speak out against Russian 
behavior on human rights and other issues. Czech are not as strong in this opposition as 
Lithuania and Poland on the other hand, who are identified as new cold warriors, who have 
overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use their veto to block EU 
negotiations with Russia. On the whole most New Europeans have shown a more cautious 
stand vis-à-vis Russia compared to their Western counterparts. For them, integration into the 
EU is a way to defend their interests as independent and sovereign states and nullify the 
potential influence of Russia in their domestic affairs.    
Czech Republic has not refrained from criticizing Russia while keeping their business 
interests high on the agenda.108 The differences in the strategies of Poland and the Czech 
Republic regarding Russia according to Coskun ‘clearly shown that in spite of similarities of 
historical memories regarding the Soviet Union, they have not developed similar policy lines 
towards Russia109 However as is in the case of Russian  most of the CEE and Baltic states 
including Czech Republic have adjusted their policies within the context of their respective 
strategic cultures as well as their economic and political considerations regarding Russia.  
The impact of Czech’s geographical position and perception of Russia on Czech strategic 
culture can be seen in its Eastern policies which are quite distinct from its Western European 
counterparts.  With Russia in mind in external relations it unsurprisingly puts emphasis on the 
Eastern neighborhood and energy security within the CFSP. Its active approach to raising 
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democracy and human rights across the globe can also be linked to Russia. These issues will 
be discussed in detail in the next chapter.   
• Russia’s different approach to ‘Old’ and New Member states- ‘ Divide and Rule 
tactics’ 
Divisions over Russia between East and West have to do with different perceptions that are 
rooted in geography and history. However these divisions have been deliberately exacerbated 
by a Russian strategy of ‘divide and rule’ towards member states.  Russia has sought to bi-
lateralize its energy deals with EU member states which make the individual EU member 
state weaker and challenges EU solidarity. As Leonard and Popescu point out ‘ It ( Russia) 
mounts charm offensives to seduce the political and economic leaders of big member states 
while coercing the weaker neighbors with political and economic pressure’. 110 Russia 
preference for dealing with states bi-laterally rather than through EU framework can be 
summarized by the statement of Konstantuin Kosachev chair of the Dumas’ international 
relations committee ‘ We are sick and tired of dealing with Brussels beaurocrats. In Germany, 
Italy, France we can achieve much more. The EU is an institution that contributes to our 
relationship, but an institution that slows down progress’. 111  
Russia’s charm offensive towards Western Member states are in sharp contrast towards it 
actions towards New Member states. Russia uses Europe’s dependence on gas and oil to attain 
its goals including the establishment of a ‘privileged relationship’ with Germany. 112 In 
Central Europe Russia tries to control gas downstream in an attempt to obtain a political tool 
over them.  In July 2008 Russia significantly cut oil supplies to the Czech Republic. An 
decision that coincided with Czech Republic signing the missile defense treaty. This was not 
the first time though in 2003 it interrupted oil supplies to Latvia and to Lithuania in 2006 
symbolic of Russia’s willingness to use coercive methods towards CEE states.  In a study of 
cuts offs or threatened cut offs of Russia energy to EU members Robert Larsson found a total 
of 55 separate instances from 1992-2006. While technical problems or accidents were offered 
by way of explanation by Russia as the cause behind the cut offs, the study concluded that 
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these events occurred at times when Russia wanted to achieve some political or economic 
objectives. 113 
Dividing ‘ New’ and ‘ Old’ Europe is one of the strategic goals of Russian policy towards 
Europe – particularly in Central Europe. It’s aim is to ‘ enfeeble European solidarity and 
stimulate divisions with the EU and NATO, and to establish its influence upon security 
related-decision making in ‘ the Eastern part of Central Europe’. 114 Those are integral 
elements of Moscow’s ‘ grand strategy’, which sees a ‘ fragmentation of the West’ and a 
capitalization on discreptencies between the US, EU and other European countries as a 
principal condition and tool of strengthening Russia’s global position. 115 The Medvedev 
foreign policy doctrine presumes that the former Soviet-bloc members are within Russia’s 
region of ‘ priviledged interests’ which consists of countries with which Russia shares ‘ 
special historical relations’, to which it is bound together as friends and good neighbors’ and 
which it has ‘ built friendly ties’. 116 This doctrine is used in reference not only to the former 
Soviet Republics but also to the former Soviet bloc members. According to Federov ‘ it may 
mean that in the longer term the Visegrad states are seen as an area for Russian geopolitical 
and economic expansion, or at least a zone of influence’.117 Russian reactions to the Czech 
missile defence plans signal that Russia wants to dictate security and defense related issus in 
the former Warsaw pact.  
For Czech Republic the fear of Russia is shaped by geo-historical experience. Today 
politicians in Czech Republic do not fear an attack but they fear the Russia political-economic 
complex that considers the Czech Republic to be their patrimony and behave accordingly. As 
shown more aggressively than they would dare in Western Europe. 118 
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• Russian approaches towards its neighborhood 
Back in 2003 and 2004 the Orange and Rose revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia were seen as 
evidence of Russia’s declining influence in the ‘near abroad’ region. However 6 years on the 
balance certainly seems to have shifted back towards Russia. As Leonard and Popescu point 
out ‘ Contrary to what many in Europe think, Russia’s neighborhood policy is better co-
ordinate, better developed and better implemented than the EU’s. Russia devoted more 
political, economic and military resources to influencing its neighborhood than the EU does’. 
119 Also Russia has plenty of carrots to offer these states the strongest being cheap energy. In 
Ukraine and Moldavia Russia has exerted great economic pressure and influenced domestic 
groups through Russian sponsored media, NGO’s, youth groups and political actors. The 
policy definitely seems to have paid dividends in Ukraine as on April 29th 2010 New 
Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych signed into law a deal extending Russia’s naval base 
in Crimea in return for 30 per cent cheaper gas imports. When carrots don’t work Russia is 
not afraid to employ sticks, with the invasion of South Ossetia sending a clear signal that 
Russia is not afraid to use force to protect its interests in its ‘ near abroad’ 
2.6.3. Domestic System 
Introduction  
Beyond size, history and geopolitics, Czech security policy and strategic culture is also 
influenced by a number of domestic factors. In this section I will look at the internal political 
setup in the Czech Republic. Here I will begin with a discourse on the two main political 
parties the ODS and the ČSSD and their attitudes and policies towards Brussels, NATO and 
Washington. Also reviewed but in less detail will be the smaller political parties such as the 
Green party, the KDU and the Communist party. 120 The need to review the positions of the 
small political parties is due to the constitutional setup in the Czech Republic (PR electoral 
system) which in practice inevitably tends to lead to weak coalition government. 121 Thus 
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under this system the influence of small parties on foreign policy tends to be magnified.  Also 
looked at will be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, institutions 
which have impacted on foreign policy making since 1989 and tend to be Atlanticist in nature.   
Discourse of the Main Political Parties - Assessing the Orientation of Czech Political 
Parties 
The object of this section is to study the security policy orientation of the main political 
parties in the Czech Republic and review the attitudes of the main parties towards the US, the 
ESDP and NATO.  In terms of methodology I will look at the position of the main parties 
when issues linked to these topics were discussed but also official party documents such as 
elections manifesto’s and public statements by politicians.  Here particular attention will be 
given to a comprehensive study carried out by the Europeum Institute on Atlanticism in the 
Czech Republic in 2008 which looked at the position of the main political parties in the 
Atlanticist-European divide in the 2006 election. The political parties’ position in 2006 will 
be compared with that in 2010 in order to access if any changes have taken place over the 
resulting four years. 122Before I begin I will first define the terms Atlanticist and Europeanist 
and how these ideological pools tend to be applied to the main political parties. Later in the 
next chapter when I look at issues such as the missile defense, the Iraq war and the Czech EU 
presidency I will test the accuracy of how these definitions generally applied towards the 
main parties.  
• Defining the Terms Atlanticist and Europeanist 
In their study by Drulak, Koran and Ruzicka identified four basic ideological pools of the 
Czech Republic towards security123, internationalism, autonomism, Europeanism and 
Atlanticism. These four ideological groups ‘ contribute to foreign policy making and foreign 
policy public debates, while sharing some basic normative assumptions about international 
relations and a desirable foreign policy orientation’. 124 
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 The ‘Europeanist’ camp are those who agree on the need to strengthen and deepen political 
integration. They tend to be lukewarm with regard the US often even opposing its foreign 
policy. Their view of Russia is more pragmatic and focuses on the development of their 
economic policies. 125This orientation is strong in ČSSD and very strong in Greens. 
‘Atlanticist’ according to Koran represents ‘mirror image of Europeanists’. 126 For Atlanticists 
emphasis is placed on developing relations with the US (Bi-laterally or multi-laterally) and in 
strengthening NATO. On the whole Atlantic cists tend to be guarded about deeper EU 
integration with a preference for widening over deepening. They are critical of the EU’s plans 
for a common and defense policy, a goal which they see as incompatible with transatlantic 
defense. To a varying degree Atlanticist are rather hesitant with regard Russia, perceiving it as 
a potential threat and prefer instead to place stress on the political rather than the economic 
dimension. 127 The ODS tends to adopt this position they support Czech membership to the 
EU but have serious doubts about it at the same time.  For Atlanticists the EU is based on 
economic benefits while NATO is based on common values. 128 
A ‘Sovereignist’ or ‘Autonomist’ approach is one which involves not allying with the US or 
any other actor. The Communist party adopts such a position and would like Czech Republic 
to leave NATO and is very hesitant towards the EU. 129 
‘Internationalists’ deem the EU and the US to be equally important and see no paradox 
between having a strong NATO and a strong European defense capabilities. They see both as 
providing further socio-economic and liberal development as well as security and therefore 
the US and Germany are considered as essential partners.  In the event of a clash between the 
US and the EU such as the war in Iraq Internationalist tend to avoid a strong stance towards 
either side. Also internationalists tend to be active promoters of human rights and democracy 
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throughout the world. This position is best represented in the Czech Republic by the Christian 
Democrat KDU party. 130 
These definitions give an outline of the main dividing lines and approaches of Czech Republic 
to security. However it is impossible to separate these entirely and instead often best to deal 
with these approaches on a case by case basis. As will be shown parties do not always line up 
under these approaches but as a general rule parties do accord to these positions131. Example 
of a break away from these ideological can be seen in the ODS under Klaus certainly which 
shows elements of a sovereignist approach especially in its Euro-Skeptic attitude.  
Also it is important to take into consideration the distinction between government and 
opposition as parties tend to speak and act much differently when in power compared to out 
of power. In opposition parties are much freer to criticize in the knowledge that they are not 
liable. In Czech Republic the difference between government and opposition is particularly 
strong with the populist nature of party leaders something that needs to be taken into 
consideration. This difference between government and opposition will be seen later in my 
analysis when I look at the CSSD’s position towards the war in Iraq and also the missile 
defense.  
Position of the Political Parties  
• Czech political parties relationship with NATO and the ESDP 
With regards NATO support for the alliance raises as you go from left to right with the 
Communist’s calling for its dissolvement and the ODS being the most supportive.  The same 
applies the other way around towards the ESDP with support rising from right to left. 132 133 
The ODS’s position towards these two organization can be seen in the party documents 
during the 2006 election campaign. In the election programme of 2006 the ODS state that the 
ESDP must develop not a substitute for NATO. 134 The party does support some precisely 
defined tasks for the ESDP without the US however only if this is done not at the expense of 
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creating duplicity. The ODS is also against the creation of the European army. In the ODS 
documents Czech army reform and ensuring interoperability with NATO missions is 
considered the main imperative with involvement in the ESDP seen as not being important.135 
It also rejects the EU defense clause among EU members and feels strongly that the EU 
should not develop into a defense union.   
In the 2010 election campaign the clearest change in position compared to 2006 can be seen 
in the ODS party. Those who advocated the usefulness of European Integration in the security 
realm have gained weight over the past four years. One an individual level the biggest change 
has been the partial retreat of Jan Zahradil and the rise of Alexandr Vondra (Named shadow 
foreign Minister of the ODS in election campaign). MEP Jan Zahradil is a strong Atlanticist 
and is vocally against political integration of the EU in the foreign policy field. Although Mr. 
Vondra is a very sound Atlanticist, he is more Internationalist than Zahradil and is more open 
to co-operation with the EU. Vondra’s switch to a more internationalist position in recent 
times can be linked to his role as deputy Prime Minister of EU affairs during the Czech EU 
presidency (Socialization factors) and also America’s decline in interest in Central Europe.  
ODS thinking can be linked to the weak nature of the ESDP. The ODS election document of 
2006 highlights low military spending among EU countries with  only 5 out of 15 member 
states spending more than 2% of GDP on defense.136 Petr Necas leader of the ODS and 
possible next Prime Minsiter is also one of the leading defense experts within the party and 
also drafted large parts of the agenda on foreign policy. In the documents he highlights the 
defense technology capability gap between the US and European allies, including overall 
defense spending. In light of this he argues the EU will not be able to develop to replace 
NATO in the near future. 137  
The long term programme of the CSSD attaches ‘great importance to the construction of 
effective foreign and security policy of the European union which is a necessary precondition 
for enhancing the EU’s role in the international community and an important instrument for 
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crises and conflict prevention as well as for effective management of existing conflicts’ 138 It 
calls of member states of the EU to create a united, internally co-ordinated and legislatively 
anchored defense system.  The position of the Social Democrats is built on a long vision 
which sees Czech security as being built on two pillars the ESDP and NATO.  However it is 
clear from a discourse of the party’s documents that the CSSD party is much more 
enthusiastic about an independent role for the EU in foreign policy.  
Among the smaller parties the KDU-CSL who in previous election gained 7 per cent of the 
vote and 13 seats in the Chamber of Deputies acknowledge the dominant role of the US in 
NATO but claims that in the event of local conflicts in Europe- European capabilities should 
be developed and by deployed. The party manifesto supports transatlantic link and advocates 
more responsibility for European NATO member however it rules out any steps that would 
run counter to NATO and weaken the organization. 139 
For the Green party deepening of the ESDP is an indispensible part of European integration. 
For the Green party the long term goal is that the European defense capabilities replace 
NATO in Europe. It calls on EU member states to be more assertative in their relations with 
the United States, including NATO, and to take into account the interests of the EU as defined 
by the EU CFSP, especially should the US policy remain as unilateral and controversial as it 
has after 9/11. 140 
The Communist party remains true to their sovereignist orientation and call for a Czech 
withdrawal from NATO military structures. There is no direct reference to the ESDP in the 
party documents but it is safe to assume that the party also has a negative stance towards 
ESDP and would not support an active Czech approach within the ESDP. 141 
• Position towards Europe 
As far as attitudes towards the EU are concerned it must be acknowledged that this is a highly 
complicated political position and that all parties support the EU with different degrees of 
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enthusiasm. The ODS especially when Klaus was ruler was seen as quite a Euro-skeptic party 
and the relationship between the ODS and EU being seen more as a ‘ marriage of 
convenience’ 142 The ODS is opposed to ‘more Europe’ in Czech affairs and instead of 
majority voting prefers looser alliances. However since 2006 evidence suggests that the party 
is becoming more ‘Europeanist’, especially the EU Presidency seems to have affected the 
party and begun a ‘Europeanization’ process within the party.  
 In contrast then CSSD tends to be much more positive towards the EU. 143 Its position is 
often closely in line with the Socialists parties in the European institutions.  
• US military Presence in Europe 
Although election manifesto’s and party document rarely make direct reference to the 
desirability to maintain an American military presence in Europe a divergence between 
parties can be seen. In the ODS election manifesto of 2006 it stated ‘American engagement in 
Europe is a necessary pre-condition for it is absolutely essential and that ‘only the 
transatlantic link is a guarantee of our civilization’. 144 Similarly Jan Zahradil ODS leader in 
the European parliament argues that ‘ American engagement in Europe into the NATO 
framework is the best guarantee of the general interests of the Euro-Atlantic civilization and is 
in the long term, a necessary pre-condition of European security and stability. 145  This 
position has remained the same over the last four years. When asked during the election 
campaign if he would be happy if America were to withdraw from Europe, Vondra said he 
would not support any such moves and that the Czech Republic must make every effort to 
maintain a US presence. 146 
                                                           
142 Europeum document 
143 Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V, ‘ Views on American foreign policy: the Atlanticism of Political Parties in 
Central and Eastern Europe’, Europeum Institute of European policy: 67 
144 ODS election manifesto 2006: cited in Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V, ‘ Views on American foreign 
policy: the Atlanticism of Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe’, Europeum Institute of European 
policy: 69 
145 ODS 2006 cited in Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: opt cit: 71 
146 Vondra, Alexandr, ‘ Symposium Czech Foreign Policy’, 3-5 May 2010, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
66 
 
The CSSD long term programme contains a relatively extensive chapter on foreign, security 
and defense policy yet no direct reference to the issue of US military presence in Europe. 
Instead most emphasis is placed on the European Security and Defense project. 
 Similarly the KDU-CSL and the Green party make no direct reference to the issue of US 
military presence in Europe in their manifesto’s either. The autonomist communist party calls 
for the removal of US troops from Europe. 147 
Before beginning this section I asked the question if a consensus existed among the main 
parties on foreign policy issues now that the twin goals of NATO and EU integration had 
been achieved. From this we can see that the consensus that dominated Czech foreign policy 
in the 1990s and early 2000s that pushed for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions has 
largely disappeared and that the Czech political scene is clearly polarized. When it gets down 
to attitudes towards the US-EU-NATO the division of the Czech political scene along the 
right-left axis is clearly visible. This short introduction of the position of the political party’s 
confirms the hypothesis of Kral, Weiss and Rihacova and the ideological pools of Koran 
which show that the more the party is to the right the more it tends to follow a closer 
alignment with the US, the further left the more likely to are to partake in a more Anti-
American stance. Thus a clear left-right distinction is clearly visible in the Czech political 
scene. This divide between Atlanticist and Europeanist positions will be elaborated upon in 
the next Chapter in the case studies.  
Chart 2 Positioning of Czech Parties on the left = right axis 
 
Summary of Different approaches to foreign policy issues among two main parties 
Position towards US 
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ODS – Czech Republic should make every effort to formulate strong relationship with US 
either through NATO or direct bi-lateral relationship 
CSSD – Relations with US should be through the EU or NATO framework 
Russia 
CSSD – much more pragmatic – tends to emphasize economic benefits over ideological  
ODS – much more Russia skeptic 
ESDP 
ODS – ESDP must not develop as a substitute to NATO 
CSSD – Supports to development of a strong ESDP 

ATO 
ODS – NATO primary vehicle for European defense 
CSSD- Supports NATO but tends to be more enthusiastic about ESDP 
Deeper European Integration 
ODS – has skeptical elements in the party – those surrounding Klaus see it as a threat to 
Czech sovereignty  
CSSD – Pro-Strong European integration 
Continuity and Change? 
Despite this distinction between the main political parties Czech foreign policy tends to show 
a large degree of continuity and stability. This can be explained by three factors, the electoral 
system in the Czech Republic, the strong role played by the Ministry of Defense and Ministry 
of Foreign affairs and that parties tend to act differently in government then when in 
opposition.  
Electoral system 
Another factor often overlooked but still a determinant which very much impacts of Czech 
Foreign and Security policy is the electoral system of the country. The current electoral 
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system of the Czech Republic inevitably leads to weak, divided, coalition governments. The 
result of this is that decisions in foreign policy are often a result of consensus of the coalition 
parties and leads to a dilution and moderation of policies. Thus the government position on 
foreign policy issues where the EU-NATO-US triangle is more likely to be moderate that the 
individual partisan positions of the senior coalition parties – the CSSD and ODS.  The impact 
of the electoral system and coalition governments will be looked at in more detail when I 
discuss the multi-lateralizing of the missile defense project in the next chapter.  
Government versus Opposition 
Parties tend to act much differently when in opposition compared to in power. For example 
the CSSD tends to be much less critical of the US when in power than in opposition.  This 
will be shown in the next chapter when we discuss the missile defense case. Also the ODS 
tends to adopt more pro-European policies than its programme documents. How much of this 
to do with a gradual process of ‘Europeanization ‘  taking place within the party 148or just a 
pragmatic approach given that they meet European leaders in Brussels much more often that 
the US remains is hard to gauge.   
Institutional Stickiness – Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The Czech Republic places much power in the executive branch which compromises mainly 
the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign affairs. Both these institutions tend to be 
Atlanticist be nature. The MoD is traditionally more strongly orientated towards NATO and is 
viewed as a stable institution for safeguarding Czech security interests. 149 The Ministry of 
Foreign affairs tends to be more sensitive to the position of member states within the EU. 
150These ministries have been very influential in key foreign policy making over the past 20 
years but have begun to see a marginal decline in influence in the more recent years. We can 
also see that Parliament over the last number of years has become increasingly assertive in 
holding substantial debates on topics such as international treaties, major military 
procurement and participation in international military operations. Already we are beginning 
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to see power shift more and more towards the Parliament151.  The large influence of the MFA 
and MOD in foreign and security policy is as much due to the expertise of its staff compared 
to the Parliament. The actual influence of these ministries is derived from their 
interrelationship with the relevant actors and the issues at play. According to Koran ‘In the 
regard, the recent development is not exactly favorable for retaining the MFA’s privileged 
position in foreign policy affairs’. 152 Already the declining influence of the MFA can be seen 
in the creation of the role of the Vice Prime Minister of European Affairs during the Czech 
EU Presidency a move designed to give the Presidency a more ODS based focus and decline 
the influence of the Ministries in this areas.  
Conclusion  
At the beginning of the chapter I asked the question whether a consensus exists on foreign and 
security policy issues exists now that the Czech Republic has become a member of NATO 
and ESDP. From my analysis it is clear that a consensus does not exist and that Czech 
Republic’s Atlanticist orientation is supported by the ODS party and the Ministries but not 
shared by the more left wing CSSD.  
Also this chapter showed that Czech Republic’s Atlanticism is linked to geo-political factors 
and also a strategic calculation on the part of Czech elites thus proving my Hypothesis 
prepared at the beginning of the chapter.  
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Chapter 3 - Case Studies 
‘It is not about the size of a nation or its territory but rather the relationship of the people to its 
territory. There are many examples of this throughout history…..A nation must develop its 
own tactics. Switzerland has neither coal nor iron, but it is the foremost industrial country 
after England’ 153 T G Masaryk 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 gave a brief introduction to the concept of security culture and the specifics of 
Czech security culture.  In this next section I will be analyzing Czech national security 
strategy in relation to the ESDP and America through case studies. Part 1 of this chapter is 
dedicated to Czech-American relations from 1999 onwards. Here my hypothesis will say that 
the primary motivation of Czech security policy is to ‘keep American military commitments 
to the region alive and credible’ and that Czech actions since 1999 have reflected this.  In this 
section I will use two case studies the Iraq War and the proposed missile defense system in 
the Czech Republic that represent Czech Republic’s pro-Atlanticist viewpoint but also the 
polarization that exists between the Czech political parties and elites in these issues. In 
particular the Missile Defense system will be studied in depth. Particular focus will be given 
to the missile defense system because the project is revealing of Czech strategic culture.  By 
analyzing Czech reactions to the missile defense project, this section purports to bring better 
understanding both of Czech attitudes towards the CFSP and the US but also their standpoints 
towards Russia. As I will show in this Chapter the Atlanticism orientation of the Czech 
Republic as highlighted in the case studies of Iraq and Missile defense has had perceptions of 
Russia as an underlying motive.  
 
In part two of this chapter I will look at Czech preferences within the CFSP. Here a case study 
of the Czech Republic EU presidency will be utilized. By examining the core priorities of the 
Czech EU Presidency, transatlantic co-operation, energy security and Eastern Partnership 
again the Russia motivation will be highlighted.   
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These case studies will allow me to test Hypothesis two of my thesis which states  
‘Given the geo-political and historical context, Czech Republic still sees Russia as a major 
security threat to its sovereignty and independence and has developed its security strategies 
within the European defense, NATO and bi-lateral ties with the United States to check direct 
Russian influence in its affairs’. 
The case studies have been chosen to explore Czech preferences vis-à-vis NATO/US and the 
ESDP. In light of this I will not go into great detail with regards the background and happens 
in the event but instead look at how they impacted upon the orientation of Czech security 
between Washington, NATO and Brussels.  Thus in each of the case studies I will look at the 
positions of the main political parties with regards the conflicts and situations. By doing this I 
will highlight that although Czech Republic did follow a certain path the attitude among the 
main parties was very divergent and thus is no guarantor that Czech Republic will follow the 
same path if a  similar event occurs in the future.  Furthermore the case studies will also offer 
the opportunity to test the aforementioned ideological pools of Atlanticist and Europeanist 
which Czech parties fit into. Also highlighted will be public opinion during these proceedings. 
With regards Public opinion it will be shown in the case studies that the Atlanticist orientation 
of Czech elites has on the whole been at odds with Czech public opinion. 
3.2.  Case Study 1: War in Iraq 
In this section I will look at Czech motivations in joining Operation freedom Iraqi. My focus 
here will not be on the event itself but the motivations and positions of the main political 
parties. Iraq represents a good example of parties acting according to their ideological pools, 
with the ODS as expected adopting a more Atlanticist approach than ČSSD. The case study 
will also highlight how parties tend to act differently in power than in opposition, with the 
ČSSD support of the war reflecting this. Later I will briefly look at Slovakia and show how 
the Iraq war affected Slovak security policy orientation with a shift away from Atlanticism. 
By reflecting on the situation in Slovakia my aim is to show that the Atlanticist orientation of 
the CEE countries is not set in stone and given the right circumstance has the potential to 
change. Here I hope to demonstrate that had the right wing ODS rather than the ČSSD been in 
power at the time of the Iraq war then it is possible than one would likely have seen the  first 
emergence of a genuine debate in Czech Republic on its security orientation amongst the 
Czech public post 1989.  
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Efforts to develop a common European foreign and security policy were given a major 
setback with the intra=European split that emerged in early 2003. During the Iraqi crises, the 
behavior of the prospective EU members confirmed the Old Members prejudices that the 
newcomers would be pro- American. Most of the CEE states supported the war and responded 
to the US calls for the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1441. The Czech 
Republic along with Hungary, Poland, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Britain signed the 
‘letter of eight’ to call for European unity in the Security Council on the enforcement of 
Resolution 1441. In the Czech Republic the signing of the letter caused debates on the 
national consensus since the letter was signed by Former President Vaclav Havel three days 
before leaving office. Havel said he signed the letter because he agreed with its content and 
because it did not contradict the official position of the government. 154  
The Atlanticist orientation of the Czech Republic during the split resulted in a strong reaction 
from some European states most notably France. According to French President Jacques 
Chirac the actions of the Czech Republic and other pro-Atlanticist states was ‘dangerous, 
reckless, not well behaved and that ‘they had missed a great opportunity to shut up’.  While 
the Czech Republic contributed troops in Iraq, it also avoided making public statements of 
support for the war. This position reflected a desire to repair the relationship with France and 
Germany damaged in the lead up to the war. This new position as referred to by Czech Prime 
Minister Vladimir Spidla was ‘precisely in the middle between the EU and the US’155. The 
repositioning also reflected the removal of President Havel from office, a Pro-Atlanticist who 
had signed the Letter of Eight without consulting the government. Thus according to Marek 
and Baun the rebalancing on the Iraq War was ‘Inevitable after the government was bounced 
into its initial strong support for the US by a lame duck President’. 156 
Public Opinion 
Public support for the war was affected by the fact that the operation in Iraq did not go 
through the UN Security Council. Prior to the war support was split 50-50 provided it went 
through the UN Security Council in 2002. A poll conducted by CVVM agency in March 2003 
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showed the falling support with just 12% of the population now saying they would support 
the was without the backing of the UN Security Council and 12% without UN Security 
Council support. 157 
Position of the Main political parties on Iraq 
The Czech involvement in Iraq shows deep divisions not just between parties but within 
parties and other constitutional actors as well. Generally speaking the ODS who were in 
opposition at the time supported the war but were critical of the government’s handling of it. 
The major exception was outspoken honorary chairman and current President Vaclav Klaus 
who criticized many aspects of the operation.  
Within the Social Democrats there was a much greater division than within the ODS over 
Iraq. With the party several strong dividing lines emerged, between the members of the 
cabinet (including Prime Minister Spidla and Minister of Defense Tvrdik) and CSSD 
parliamentarians, but also between the wider partisan base of the CSSD and members holding 
office. 158 The ministers of the CSSD had to balance between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
of Defence 159both of which adapted a pro-Atlanticist pro American approach supporting 
Czech involvement in the operation and the majority of the CSSD party base who were 
against Czech involvement.  160 CSSD Chairman of the foreign affairs committee Vladimir 
Lastuvka was a very vocal critic of the government’s position and in his view the government 
should have aligned themselves much closer to the Europeanist position of France and 
Germany. At the CSSD party Congress in MARCH 2003, the party overwhelmingly adopted 
an anti-war resolution, initiated by Lastuvka, Richard Falbr (then senator current MEP) and 
Jan Kavan (senator and former Minister of Foreign affairs) which condemned the ‘war 
conducted by the USA, Great Britain, and the so called alliance against Iraq, which was 
initiated without the consent of the international community and according to the Congress, is 
thus conducted contrary to international law’161. In an interview with the left wing daily Pravo 
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(2003) Falbr stated ‘It is necessary for the CSSD congress to do it (condemn the war). Either 
they are socialists or they are not. Either they believe in the American babble on the 
preventative war or they believe in a collective security system that has been built over 
decades’. 162 The divide within the CSSD over the war in Iraq and the ambivalent attitude of 
Social Democrat Ministers and mainstream party members showed just how the party is not 
cohesive when it comes to foreign policy issues involving the US and the EU.  
• Impact of the Iraq War on the orientation of Slovak foreign and security policy 
Since 2003, New Europe’s willingness to support the US in order to enhance its national 
security has been challenged domestically.  In Iraq while the governments continued to 
support Washington, their policies were increasingly divorced from the general population. 
Throughout the Visegrad states Centre left parties were in power and became the standard 
bearers of the war. The one exception to this rule however was Slovakia, where a centre right 
coalition led by Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda had held power since 1998. When they 
sided with Washington over Iraq the main opposition party Smer was handed an opening.  As 
Valasek states ‘ a relatively young and new entity, Smer had no personal attachment to the 
policies of the first post-Cold War generation of Slovak politicians; a veiled anti- American 
tone also resonated well with its left leaning base’.  The party called on a radical re-evaluation 
of Slovakia’s security policy, drawing on earlier statements of Smer chairman and current 
prime Minister Robert Fico from March 2003 when he dubbed the Dzurinda government ‘ 
reckless, un-European, warlike and undermining the authority of the UN’. 163 The party 
moved closer to the Franco-German non-interventionist position on Iraq, and has begun to 
consistently place emphasis on the European dimension of security. While remaining pro-
NATO in principle the Smer party, also tended the view the NATO alliance as a vehicle to 
restrain the actions of the United States.  During the 2004 elections to the European 
parliament, for the first time in the history of any V4 state, the European Union’s foreign and 
security policy itself appeared in campaign rhetoric, with Smer calling on the EU to counter 
‘US Hegemony’.164   
                                                           
162 Falbr interview with Pravo cited in Kral et al: opt cit: 85 
163 Valesek: opt cit: 221 
164 Valesek: opt cit: 222 
75 
 
In Czech Republic the Iraq controversy did not spark as much controversy in the electoral 
discourse that might have been expected. The reason behind this lies in the composition of the 
government in the Czech Republic with the country being governed by a centre left coalition 
at the time. It was the Social Democrats in coalition with the KDU and US DEU who found 
themselves forced to take sides in the run up to the Iraq War. According to Kral, Rihackova 
and Weiss ‘They did so in conformity with the Czech Republic’s long standing foreign policy 
course and against their better instincts’. 165 Thus the left wing parties became the standard 
bearers for the war in Iraq.  The right wing opposition party in keeping with their foreign 
policy preferences, tended to be as pro-war as governments if not more. 166  The result of the 
left wing governments in three out of the four Visegrad states meant that ‘ The Iraq debate in 
Prague, Warsaw and Budapest was generally limited to the technicalities of the government’s 
handling of the crises rather than the broad principles, thus sheltering the governments and 
their foreign policy course from criticism.’167 However the swiftness by which Smer in 
Slovakia disposed of 15 years of Slovak foreign policy questions how firmly Atlanticism 
entrenched is in the Foreign and Security policies of the CEE states and suggests that the 
Czech Republic given the right circumstances is not inherently immune to a repeat of the 
Slovak scenario.   
3.3.   Case Study 2 Missile Defense 
The Missile Defense project is an issue that touches upon the very roots of the roots of post 
1989 Czech Security policy, key strategic interests relating to US presence in Europe and the 
perception of a new strategic environment.  It is arguably the most controversial issue 
concerning relations with the US since 1989 and once again shows the divide and lack of 
consensus among and between the main political parties within Czech society. In the missile 
defense issue the difference between the two main parties the ODS and CSSD is clearly 
visible At the heart of the issue is the debate whether the project should be part on a bi-lateral 
security arrangement between the US and the Czech Republic creating a ‘special relationship’ 
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or kind or instead the Czech Republic should adopt a much more multi-lateral approach under 
the NATO framework and with the support of its EU counterparts.168  
• Brief Background 
The Bush administration decided to go ahead with the plan of placing the so-called third pillar 
of the US National Defense (BMD) by placing its components in the Czech Republic (X band 
radar) and Poland (ten ground-based, exo- atmospheric interceptors).169 The issue of the third 
pillar of the BMD was originally discusses on a purely bi-lateral basis between the US 
government and the Czech and Polish governments. Although Washington as well as Warsaw 
preferred this format from the very beginning, the effect of Czech pressure (mainly due the 
preferences of the Green party, a junior coalition member of the minority government at the 
time) led to the so called NATO-isation / multi-lateralization of the project170.  According to 
Hynek this was a logical move from a strategic point of view, as the BMD was to become a 
complementary part of the NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense project. 
171  The resulting form was designed to provide for a complex defense of all types of ballistic 
missile threats. The process of NATO-isation was officially embraced at the Bucharest 
Summit Final Declaration issued in April 2008. However it is clear that prior to the Bucharest 
Conference the Czech Republic strove to keep the BMD project as bi-lateral as possible and 
they started to seek NATO endorsement only after domestic pressures by the green party in 
the minority government. The formal declaration was crucial as it forged an uneasy consensus 
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at the multilateral level, suppressing previous criticisms of the third pillar of the BMD by the 
European allies. 172 
Motivations of the Radar Base 
In this section I will discuss the motivations of the radar base for the Czech Republic. Within 
Czech society and within the media discourse there seems to have been a mix-up as to what 
the radar meant and the motivations behind the governments embracing of the project.  
Officially the radar had two motivations, the first was the prevent a long range missile from 
the Middle Eastern region generally thought to be Iran from successfully targeting the 
American mainland with the second being to strengthen bi-lateral relations with the United 
States. Later especially following the Georgian crises the Russian factor came into the 
equation. How big a motivation the perceived threat of Russia was for the ODS led 
government will be looked at in this analysis.  
• Protection from Iran 
Despite the threat from Iran being one of the state intentions of the project it definitely was 
not a major factor in the thinking of the Czech elites. The threat of an Iranian attack certainly 
wasn’t felt among the Czech public and was a secondary motivation for Czech elites at best. 
Similarly in interviews with academics the threat of attack from Iran was played down as an 
incentive ‘If Iran was a motivation there would have been a request for that and not just 
accepting the American request’. 173 However the Czech government for the large part up 
until the conflict in South Ossetia was excellent in the discourse and in saying to the media 
that this was one of the primary reasons.  
• Keep alliance Credible  
As already outlined in chapter 2 being part of an alliance means that efforts must be made to 
keep the alliance function able and strong for the Czech Republic.  Thus when America the 
dominant actor inside the NATO alliance asks for a favor, there is no reason to say no. This 
feeling of giving something back and giving material meaning to the alliance definitely seems 
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to have been a major motivation for Czech elites‘ an alliance means something concrete so 
that was the motivation to become involved and integrated with allies, not just being an ally 
on paper but also to do something on our territory,  that was the motivation and it was part of 
a deep conviction that an alliance is not just political commitment it has concrete expressions, 
that ( the Missile defense) was seen as the concrete expression…. this small symbolic 
contribution of having an ally on our territory and showing that we are not a second class 
ally.’174. This can be seen as part of Czech efforts to keep an alliance alive and credible and 
can be traced back to the formative experiences of 1938 where weak alliances were unable to 
prevent Nazi Germany.  
• Strengthen Bilateral Ties 
The strengthening of bi-lateral ties definitely seems to have a major motivation for the 
embracement of the MD project in Czech Republic by the ODS led government. The 
motivation was that it was the ‘first real offer’ to do something with Americans after Czech 
entry to NATO on Czech territory. It was seen as an opportunity to co-operate with America 
in an area that the Americans consider important. The preference for having the missile 
defence negotiations at a bi-lateral level with the America’s was reflective of the ODS’s 
ideological orientation. The feeling was that if the negotiations became multilateralized then it 
would lose some of its exclusivity.  
Some within the ODS felt that the missile defense would result in a special relationship being 
formed between the United States and the Czech Republic, ‘ All talk was about having a 
special relationship at the Ministry, the US officials would call them every time something 
happened and they all were delighted with the increased communication’.175 The idea of a 
special relationship was certainly one of the main goals of European Affairs Minister 
Alexandr Vondra. 176177 However one must keep in mind that Czech Republic had limited 
influence in the project and that it was an American project from the start till the very end.   
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• Reinforce US commitments to Europe 
The primary motive behind the missile defense was to keep American commitments to the 
Czech Republic alive and credible and is reflective of the declining confidence in NATO in 
the Czech Republic. The worst case scenario thinking of Czech elites from a military sense 
was that even if NATO ceases to be, the US will provide security to places where they have 
soldiers.  
• Russian Link 
A clear indication of the Russian link in Czech motivations behind the radar can be seen 
between the linking of the Russian invasion of Georgia to the American BMD project by 
leading Czech politicians. ‘The Best campaign for the radar was the campaign in South 
Ossetia’178. With this statement the Czech Prime Minister Topolanek contradicted the official 
reasons of the site being a deterrent towards Iran and strengthening bi-lateral ties with the US 
and instead we can see that the PM clearly had the threat of Russia in mind. In terms of 
Russia, the missile defense was seen as a counter against Russia in two ways, the first was 
that it would embed Czech Republic in the Atlantic alliance and prevent Russia from 
attempting to divide Europe between ‘ East’ and ‘West’ while the second and more 
questionable motivation was that by having US installations in Czech Republic it would 
provide territorial defense from a Russia invasion. 
• Anchored in Western Civilization  
The Missile Defense project would have further embedded Czech Republic in the Euro-
Atlantic area. In a symbolic sense it would have showed that Czech Republic had ceased to be 
an area of Russian influence or in Russia’s ‘near abroad’. By hosting the Missile Defense 
facility the Czech Republic (and Poland) would deprive Russia from dividing NATO into two 
categories of countries, East and West.  
• Territorial Defense from Russia 
The disputed idea that the radar would provide territorial defense from a Russian invasion 
certainly existed among some members of the Czech elite. The missile defense presents a 
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‘security dilemma’ in that it antagonizes Russia while strengthening US commitment to the 
region. The idea was that ‘if the Russian’s come to US will be there for us’. The rationale 
among some members of the Czech elites was that the benefits of increased US support 
outweighed the costs of angering Russia. The logic behind this line of thinking was much 
divided among interviewees. 179 
Motivations Conclusion 
Even without its realization the BMD project as revealing of Czech strategic cultures. The 
motivations for the Czech Republic in participating in the BMD project listed show that the 
BMD project grounded in the Czech Republic primary security objective: a continued 
American presence in Europe with the additional benefits of increasing bi-lateral ties to the 
United States. Officially the Czech justification and discursive presentation of the project was 
based on the assessment of the threat posed by Iran and the ‘transatlantic narrative’. However 
the Russian factor certainly emerged in the argumentation after the Georgian crises thus the 
project clearly has subjective value and thus validates the Constructivist hypothesis on 
security supported in this thesis. This subjective value of the project can be seen in  former 
President Havel’s comments that the Czech Republic should partake to the project ‘ even if 
we don’t know whether it will work or not’. 180 
• Position of the Main Political Parties towards Missile Defence 
During the Missile Defence project the main parties further conformed to their ideological 
pools. The ODS overwhelmingly supported the installation of the Missile Defence base. The 
majority of the party was behind Chairman and Prime Minister Topolánek and EU affairs 
Minister Vondra both great supporters of the project.  Within the ODS efforts were made to 
keep the project as bi-lateral as possible with the thinking being that the more the project was 
multi-lateralized the more it would lose its exclusiveness and reduce the possibility of forming 
a special relationship with the United States.  
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The CSSD were for the most part against the project this despite the fact that the first 
deliberations on the possible location of the radar in the Czech Republic started when the 
CSSD government under Paroubek were in power. Paroubek himself claims that these were 
merely technical consultation with no decision making on the project being made.181  Six 
years after and  the most vocal opponents of the radar were CSSD radar leader Jiri Paroubek 
and his shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lubomir Zaoralek. This switch in position can be 
explained by the switch in position from government to opposition but also the radar issue 
was one of the few foreign policy issues that touched upon public opinion against is a good 
topic on which to challenge the government with an upcoming election in mind. 182 In 
arguments against the radar the CSSD outlined the following positions: the treaty was a 
bilateral deal between the US and the Czech Republic and would eventually weaken NATO 
and the CFSP183, it only serves to defend American territory not Czech or European, there is 
no imminent threat of a missile defense attack and that it will damage Czech Republic’s 
relationship towards Russia. 184 
• Public Opinion and Missile Defence 
Public opposition to the radar remained high, despite intensive PR efforts of both the Czech 
and US governments. On average 70% of the Czech population were opposed to the 
construction of the radar, with 20% in favor and the rest all undecided. The position of the 
parties tends to go along with the position of their electorates. A survey undertaken by CVVM 
polling agency in July 2008 suggests that 68 per cent of ODS supporters were for while 88 per 
cent of Communist voters are against.185 Within the CSSD 80 per cent of supporters were 
against. 186 Overall 74% of the public were against the missile defense site, thus once again 
Atlanticism can be viewed as a project of the elite running counter to public opinion.  
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182 Although the Czech Public are for the most part disengaged from foreign policy decision issue the radar issue 
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183 This is reflective of the CSSD’s overall greater preference for security arrangements to be multilateralised   
184 Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: 70 
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3.2. The CFSP ‘A promoter of Czech Interests?’ 
Having in part one looked at case studies that revealed Czech Republic’s strong sense of 
Atlanticism and need to align with America in security policy in this chapter I seek to gain an 
insight into Czech views of the ESDP and also Czech preferences within the organization.  
The degree to which Czech Republic will become ‘Europeanized’ will be to the degree that it 
comes to see the CFSP as the protector of its interests. Before the enlargement Czech 
Republic and other Central European states reacted defensively to the creation of the ESDP, 
wary of the potential overlap that it could cause in the security realm.187 However Czech and 
other CEE states perception evolved from their participation in the process as well as 
following the improvement in EU-US relations thus reducing the fear that CFSP/ESDP would 
emerge as a counterweight to Washington.188  According to Edwards they have actually 
become ‘highly active in terms of EU’s CFSP’. For Christopher Hill the most important factor 
on whether countries will not become greater supporters of the ESDP project is ‘whether or 
not national decision makers are reconceptualising their interests and identity in European 
terms’189.   
The case study of the Czech EU presidency provides an excellent opportunity to see if and 
how far the Czechs have come to see the CFSP as representative of its interests over the past 6 
years.  In order to gain an insight into Czech preferences vis-à-vis the CFSP a case study of 
the Czech EU presidency will be utilized.  The Czech EU presidency is a suitable case study 
in that for a 6 month period the country holding the EU presidency gets to set the agenda, with 
the priorities in chooses to focus on while holding the presidency revealing of how its view 
the EU and EFSP as a protector of its interests. As will be shown in this chapter during the 
EU Presidency in terms of CFSP, the Czech Republic had 3 main priorities in terms of 
transatlantic unity, common energy policy and policies towards the European 
neighborhood.190 
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3.4. Czech Priorities under CFSP: Case Study of Czech EU Presidency  
Czech Republic assumed the EU Presidency on January 2009 under the slogan ‘Europe 
without barriers’. As president of the rotating 6 Month presidential programme the Czech 
Republic was given the opportunity to set the EU’s policy agenda for a 6 month period. In its 
work programme the Czech presidency set 3 priorities the so called 3 Es, Economy, Energy 
and EU in the World (EU neighborhood policy). While economy targeted external EU policy, 
the former two had important internal dimensions that reflected Czech foreign policy interests 
and can be linked to Russia. In terms of ideological pool the Czech Presidency priorities 
reflected an internationalist orientation with an Atlanticist tinge that was characteristic of the 
ODS0 Green – KDU coalition government in Prague. 191 
• Transatlantic Relations 
The issue of transatlantic unity was a clear preference for the Czech ODS led minority 
government during the EU Presidency. As shown previously for the ODS NATO is the 
designated framework to interact with the US or they even favor bilateral relations but during 
the EU Presidency it recognized the opportunity to deal with the US through the framework of 
the EU.  As part of the Czech EU Presidency the government put improving transatlantic 
relations high on the agenda. Given the recent election of an internationalist president Barack 
Obama as President of America, a more effective co-operation between the EU and US on 
Defence was viewed optimistically. Speaking to Czech Radio prior to the Czech EU 
presidency Deputy European Affairs Minister Marek Mora said ‘the first one (priority) is 
trans-Atlantic co-operation- we would like to strengthen the EU’s relations with the United 
States in particular’. 192 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
NATO compared to the EU offers the following advantages 1 presence of the United States 2 active and 
inclusive organization 3 lack of any formal equivalent of the acquis communitarian 4 the CEE states can take 
part on re-engineering the continent 4 it is based on ‘moral values’ rather than pure economic interests 6 the 
CEE’s bridge position is retained to a greater extent 7 If the EU succeeds in shaping a truly European defense 
force, NATO will constitute the only protection for the discriminated European states not yet members of the 
EU190 8 it has a more global role. 190In contrast she only highlights 3 advantages from EU membership 1 
epitomizes the return to normalcy 2 promotes democratization 3 membership in the EU attracts foreign investors.  
191 Drulak: 2008: 23  
192 Radio Prague, ‘ Balkans among Czech EU Presidency foreign policy priorities’, September 1st 2008, available 
via http://www.radio.cz/en/article/99413 
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The Czech Republic welcomed one of the Obama administrations first decision in closing the 
Guantanamo Bay facility. Prague also held an EU-US summit in Prague on April 5th however 
the event was largely symbolic rather than substantive in nature.  Indeed throughout the EU 
Presidency little of substance was achieved in EU-US relations. ‘Despite much talk prior to 
the Czech Presidency about improving transatlantic relations, the achievement turned out to 
be rhetorical and little of substance was achieved’. 193 
• Energy Security 
Overall the Czech Republic has been very active in the energy field and unlike other CEE 
states made pro-active efforts to diversify away from its reliance on Russia gas early194.   In 
Energy issues the Czech Republic supports a harmonized EU policy of the issue and believes 
its interests in the Energy sector are best achieved through the EU framework. For the Czech 
Republic the priority is to diversify supply and reduce reliance on Russia as a supplier195. This 
can be seen in Czech Republic’s overwhelming support for the proposed Nabucco pipeline 
project. The project is a 3,300 kilometers long pipeline that will take oil from the Caspian via 
Turkey into Europe this bypassing Russia.  
 Prior to the Czech EU Presidency Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra said he supported 
a strong EU energy policy and a common European energy market ‘A genuine external 
energy policy market not thinkable without a strong single energy market. The two 
complement each other and cannot be separated’. 196 The Ukraine – Russia gas crises of 
January 2009 raised the profile of energy security in the EU and thus a greater political will 
was given to one of the top priorities of the Czech EU Presidency. For some Czech officials 
the Ukraine – Russian gas dispute of 2009 was intentionally escalated by Russia to undermine 
the credibility of Ukraine as a transit country and also to undermine the whole Eastern 
Partnership concept.  In reaction to gas crises the Czech Presidency pushed for a review of the 
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194 Czech Republic is also connected to the Western gas grid and can import from Germany in the event of a shut 
off in supplies. The Czech Republic currently receives 77% of its gas from Russia compared to some Eastern 
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195 Author, ‘ Energy Security remains elusive Prague Post, March 2010 
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strategic energy infrastructure and of the networks of major producing and transit countries, 
advocated review of the rules for creating oil contingency stocks and raised the issue of 
energy solidarity. 197 198 
• Eastern "eighborhood Policy 
The idea of enforcing the European dimension first came about during the Czech EU 
Presidency of the Visegrad group in 2007-2008. The approach leading to the gradual 
integration of the Eastern neighbors into the European economy, through deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreements, is closely linked to the Czech idea of a liberal 
economically open Europe. The long term goal of the Partnership is the establishment of a 
free trade regime with all countries involved and follows on the visa free travel agreement 
already reached with certain countries. 199 It is also part of the Czech support for the idea of 
Europe without barriers as opposed to ‘fortress Europe’ and aim’s to democratize and 
promote human rights in these countries thus moving them closer to Europe and further from 
Russia.  
Under the Czech Presidency security in Europe’s Eastern neighborhood was also given great 
priority. The Czech government placed immediate emphasis on an area where it has close 
historical roots with the immediate focus placed on pushing for Croatian accession to the EU. 
It also emphasized continued support for the Stability and Accession process in the Western 
Balkans. While promising to continue support for the Southern dimension of the European 
neighborhood policy, the Czech government gave special attention to the Eastern Dimension 
of the ENP, promising to push forward the Eastern Partnership initiative that had been 
proposed by Sweden and Poland in 2008. The plan was inaugurated in Prague in May 7th 
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2009. The approach while recognizing the key strategic importance of Ukraine and the 
Caucasus for Europe is inevitably linked to Russia.  
Czech preference for using the EU and US in its relations with Russia and its Eastern 
neighborhood can be seen in Article 45 of its Security Strategy ‘ An important part of the 
process for the Czech Republic is the deepening of NATO’S and EU’s relations with partner 
countries, encouraging a co-operative approach to security issues. The Czech Republic 
attaches great importance to the development of relations with the Russian federation, 
Ukraine, the countries of Southern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Middle East 
and North Africa’ 200 This article reflects how the Czech Republic is aware of the limitations 
of its size and is prepared to use multi-lateral institutions to promote its interests. 201 
• United Approach to Russia 
Although not a priority the Czech government also pledged to develop a United EU approach 
towards Russia. 202 The Czech Republic in this regard strove to form a balanced position 
between the ‘Russo hawks/ Cold war warriors’ like Lithuania and Poland and ‘Russo doves / 
Trojan horses/ Friendly Pragmatists such as Germany, France and Italy. While the Czech 
government tends to be much more pragmatic in co-operation with Russia than Poland it stills 
remains very cautious over Russian intentions in the EU neighborhood and increasingly so 
since the Russian invasion of South Ossetia and ‘ Reset strategy’ between Russia and the 
United States. For the Czech elites given the wide divergence of perspectives on Russian 
issues it was considered too difficult to articulate a common European position on Russia and 
thus attention should be given to analyzing and understanding Russian motives underpinning 
its policies towards the EU. The thinking behind this is that only once such an analysis is 
shared at an EU level, can a long term strategy towards Russia be developed. 203 The Czech 
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201 A test of the Eastern Partnership came in April 2009 as a result of political developments in Moldova. In the 
election of April 2009 the Communists were victors but the results were contested by the opposition, a strong 
test of EU commitments to the region. However the event occurred after the fall of the Czech government thus 
the Czech Republic’s position to mediate was severely weakened. Czech Republic was not very active on the 
issue and was limited to issuing a statement calling for an end to hostilities and respect for the rule of law. 
202 Buan, Micheal and Dan Marek, Czech Foreign Policy and EU membership: Europeanisation and Domestic 
Souces, prepapred for the 11th biannual Conference of the European Studies association, April 23-25th 2009 
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Presidency was very supportive of developing strategic dialogue on Russia, not just at a 
political level, but also among experts, research institutions and think tanks across Europe. 
However over the EU Presidency no concrete measures or platform structures on how to deal 
with Russia were proposed.  
 
3.5.   Conclusion 
It is important to see that all three priorities within the CFSP and especially the last two 
factors are linked to Russia. Czech Perceptions of Russia have influenced a standpoint on 
these two CFSP policies. The first preference of a strong transatlantic alliance with the 
motivation being to maintain an American military presence in the region is a way for the 
Czech Republic to seek to balance from Russia influence in the CEE region by having an 
American presence, alive, active and credible.  Similarly energy diversification is seen as a 
means to reduce Russia’s potential to use its resources for political means while Eastern 
Partnership is an effort to expand Democracy and human rights in Russia’s sphere of 
influence and over the medium-long term pushing these pendular countries further towards 
the EU. 
 Similarly Czech Atlanticist actions in Iraq and the Missile defense system are also linked to 
their threat perception of Russia and are means through which the Czech Republic aims to 
keep American commitments to the region alive and credible. At the beginning of the chapter 
I raised the hypothesis that ‘Given the geo-political and historical context, Czech Republic 
still sees Russia as a major security threat to their sovereignty and independence and has 
developed its security strategies within the European defense, NATO and bi-lateral ties with 
the United States to check direct Russian influence in its affairs’. From an overview of these 
case studies the evidence seems to support this hypothesis. Russia is a vital factor in 
explaining Czech Alliances within the alliance. In a hypothetical and unlikely situation that 
Russia was to disappear or given up their weapons and declare neutrality in the mourning it is 
safe to assume that Czech Security policy preferences towards the US and within the ESDP 
would change entirely.  
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
‘Regardless of what government is in power, the Czech Republic should not loathe the 
European Union that is politically more integrated. Although it is unrealistic to speak of the 
United States pulling out of Europe completely, the continent’s defense will grow 
increasingly dependent on European resources. If this is a reason why Prague worries about a 
security vacuum in Central Europe, the Czechs should pray for a stronger and more integrated 
Europe’. 204 
4.1.  Introduction 
Having in previous chapters looked at the roots and motivations behind Atlanticism in the 
Czech Republic in this chapter I will enquire into its durability. My aim here is to answer 
research objectives four and five as laid out in section 1.5 which were 1 ‘To critically assess 
of strength of Czech Republic’s Atlanticism and gauge its durability and 2 ‘To critically 
access if Czech support for the ESDP project is increasing and what the future position of the 
Czech Republic towards the ESDP is likely to be. ‘Again this chapter will be split into two 
sections. The first section will look at how Czech foreign and security has developed over the 
last 18 months following firstly the Obama administrations overall ‘reset’ strategy with 
Russia and later cancellation of the missile defense project.  
Here my hypothesis is that ‘Atlanticism in the Czech Republic will decline in upcoming years 
with the Czech Republic becoming a greater supporter of the European defense project 
however the extent of the decline will be dependent on four key variables, which political 
party/Coalition of parties is in power, the type of EU that emerges, the degree to which Czech 
interests are supported by the European defense project and American policy towards the 
region’.   
 I will show that one element of Atlanticism in the sense of trying to formulate a special bi-
lateral relationship with the United States has already begun to decline with recognition that 
Czech Republic can only foster a normal relationship with the United States.  In order to show 
this I will look at Czech preferences for a strong territorial defense commitment in 
negotiations over a new NATO strategic concept with special attention given to interviews 
with leading academics and policymakers involved in the process. Also attention will be 
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given to the position and actions of Poland over this period. Poland is both the strongest 
power in the region but also the strongest most ardent Atlanticist the CEE region. 205 In its 
role as regional leader the actions of Poland will have important implications for the Czech 
Republic. If Poland the region’s most ardent Atlanticist can be seen to be putting greater 
emphasis on the ESDP then we can reasonably expect that Czech Republic a much more 
hesitant Atlantics than Poland will sooner or later follow in the same direction.   
The second part of the chapter and the conclusion of my thesis will look at the long term 
orientation of Czech Foreign and Security policy. Here I will argue that Atlanticism in the 
Czech Republic will decline and we are likely to see the Czech Republic adopt a more 
‘Europeanist’ position. History one of the main factors behind the Atlanticism in the past 20 
years will not play as determinant a role in Czech Republic’s future as it has in the past. 
Memories fade and new elites emerge with different perspectives. Also societal factors impact 
with elites less likely to ignore public opinion as Czech democracy matures and with 
Parliament likely to play an increasingly important role vies-a- Vis the Ministry of Defence 
and Foreign Affairs in foreign policy making in the Czech Republic.   
However the speed and extent of the Europeanization process will be dependent on four main 
variables which party is in power, finding an EU consensus to deal with Russia, what type of 
EU emerges and US policy towards the region. The first is which party and what type of 
coalition is in power will also be important with the more left leaning the governing parties 
greater the possible shift towards a Europeanist position.  The greatest challenge for the CFSP 
will be to find a consensus on how to deal with Russia. For the moment this is lacking, in 
particular the position of Germany and its ability to form a consensus with Czech Republic 
and the CEE states will be vital. Also important will be what type of EU emerges.  A strong 
CFSP project will only be supported in the short and medium term by the Czech Republic as 
long as it doesn’t develop as a counter to the US. For the moment this French model seems 
dead in the water but what shape EU-US relations take in the future difficult to predict. This 
brings me on to my last point US policy towards Central Europe, Europe and the wider world. 
A multi-literalist approach with respective for international institutions will be more likely to 
keep  public opinion positive towards the US and the Czech Republic tied to the United 
States. If the US continues to priorities relations with Russia at the expense of the region or 
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trust in NATO as a security provider declines then we can expect Czech elites to place great 
emphasis of the ESDP to support its goals towards Russia.  Also if American continues to 
withdraw its presence from the European continent and lose interest in Europe as a whole then 
European’s will be left with no option but to start taking its own security policy seriously. 
 
4.2. Obama’s reset strategy – A shift to a more Europeanist position among Atlanticists 
This section will focus on the nominalization of Czech Republic and US over the past 12-18 
months. It will be done so within the geo-political context of Russia’s re-assertive attitude 
towards the region as well as the perceived US withdrawal from the region. However as this 
dissertation focus on the orientation of Czech security, the policies of Russia towards Central 
Europe while important will only be looked upon briefly and within the context of how they 
have affected Atlanticism and Europeanism. This section will look at the strategic re-
alignment of the region and the transformation of the perceived special relationship with the 
US that some within the Czech elite once believed it had to what has today been described by 
Hynek, Koran and Stritecky as ‘ normal life’.  But first I will show that Central European 
leaders were worried about Obama’s policies towards the region even prior to his reversal, a 
sentiment best embodied by the letter published in Gazetta.  Great attention will be given to 
the letter as it highlights very accurately the fears of Central European states and where they 
lay (Russia) 
In this section I will discuss the missile defense reversal of the Obama administration. Before 
I go on to discuss Czech reactions to the missile defense reversal  I will first look at how 
priorities shifted under the Obama administration shifted away from Central Europe and how 
Central Europe became something of a bargaining chip for the Obama administration as part 
of his broader geo-political goal of better relations with Russia. This shift was recognized 
immediately among leaders in Central Europe and a sense of alarmism had been raised even 
prior to the Obama administrations reversal on missile defense.  
• "o more special relationship normalization of relations under President Obama 
According to Hynek and Stritecky the reversal of the missile defense and the overall new 
strategy towards Central Europe ‘has been linked with the accession of President Barack 
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Obama as president of the United States’. 206 As the authors point out in their study of the fall 
of the missile defense site upon acceding the Presidency the Obama administration made 
important shifts away from the previous strategy of the Bush Administration. The most 
notable of these being the reframing of the third Site of BMD from a military issue into a 
political bargaining chip for talks with Russia and subsequently cancelling the project as an 
issue. 207 The politicization of the missile defense in best represented in a previous study by 
Hynek who looked at changes in policy under the New Obama administration compared to 
Bush administration. Here Hynek identifies that ‘For Obama the missile defense project has 
never represented a narrow geo-strategic issue as it was for Bush, but a political issue’. 208  
Indeed since the Obama administration took office there was a growing sentiment within the 
Czech Republic and other CEE countries that that they were being somehow left out in the 
cold by the Obama administration as America’s broader geo-political goals of better relations 
with Russia and Russia support over issues in Afghanistan and Iran was considered a far 
greater priority than missile defense in the Central European region.  The greatest 
manifestation of this shift can be seen in the presidential letter that Obama sent to Russian 
President Medvedev soon after coming into office. The latter which was latter leaked to the 
New York Times indicated that the proposed missile defense system would not be necessary 
if Moscow could help stop Iran from developing long range missile and nuclear warheads. 209 
In his letter Obama according to Hynek and Stritecky ‘completely reframed the Third Site 
from a security matter into a political bargaining chip for negotiations about the nuclear arms 
control and coordinated advance in regard to Iran’.210 
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• CEE reactions to Obama- Letter Gazeta 
The reaction and feeling of concern about the Obama administration’s stance among Czech 
and Central European leaders can be traced back to the electoral campaign for the US 
Presidency but is best represented in their letter published in Gazeta Wyborska on July 17th 
2009 where they argue that the US must not forget about the region, that the US has to carry 
out a firm and principled policy towards Russia and that missile defense is a test of 
Washington’s credibility towards the region. Among the signatories were Vaclav Havel, 
former President of Czech Republic, and Karel Schwarzenberg at the time Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Czech Republic plus other leading policymakers and former policies of CEE 
countries. In the letter it states 
 ‘As the new Obama Administration sets its foreign-policy priorities… our region is one part 
of the world that Americans have largely stopped worrying about. Indeed, at times we have 
the impression that U.S. policy was so successful [here] that many American officials have 
now concluded that our region is fixed once and for all and that they could "check the box" 
and move on to other more pressing strategic issues. Relations have been so close that many 
on both sides assume that the region's transatlantic orientation, as well as its stability and 
prosperity, would last forever. That view is premature’ 211 
The Letter also makes direct reference to the Russia’s active approach in its near abroad 
region  
‘At the same time, storm clouds are starting to gather on the foreign policy horizon. Like you, 
we await the results of the EU Commission's investigation on the origins of the Russo-
Georgian war. But the political impact of that war on the region has already been felt. Many 
countries were deeply disturbed to see the Atlantic alliance stand by as Russia violated the 
core principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and the territorial integrity of a 
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country that was a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council -all in the name of defending a sphere of influence on its borders’ 212 
Tellingly it refers to Russia as a ‘revisionist power’ in its actions towards the region ‘with its  
( Russia’s) own aspiration in what it sees as its near abroad region at a global level, Russia has 
become, on most issues, a status-quo power. But at a regional level and vies-a-vies our 
nations, it increasingly acts as a revisionist one. It challenges our claims to our own historical 
experiences. It asserts a privileged position in determining our security choices. It uses overt 
and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically 
motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and 
to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.’  
Also discussed are energy security and the fear that NATO as an organization is ‘perceived as 
becoming less and less relevant…. NATO today seems weaker than when we joined’ 
Probably the most telling aspect of the letter is that it questions whether NATO which it 
describes as ‘the only credible hard power security guarantee we have ‘would be willing and 
able to come to our defense in some future crises’ This can be interpreted as concern over 
Russia which it refers to a second time as ‘a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-century agenda 
with 21st-century tactics and methods’ and is reflective of the post-Georgian war anxiety in 
the region.  
For regional leaders the concern highlighted in the letter is that current lack of interest in 
Central European region could lead to a ‘ neutralization of the region’ and makes references 
to the negative history that the region has had when it succumbed to ‘realism’ and suffered at 
the hands of broader geopolitics. The letter also makes reference to the MD project which it 
describes ‘as a symbol of America's credibility and commitment to the region’  
Later after the letter was published Czech Foreign Minister at the time Karel Schwarzenberg 
said the main motivation behind sending the letter to the Obama administration was to keep 
American engaged in Europe and to keep Central Europe on America’s list of priorities 
‘Lately I don't know whether Barack Obama doesn't understand Moscow's ambitions in our 
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part of the world or simply underestimates them. Perhaps, with China, Iran, and the whole of 
Middle East on his mind, Mr. Obama has crossed us off his priorities list. If this is the case, 
then our role is to make him aware of that mistake. And this is not about saving the missile 
defense at all cost. Still, our consent to it was a confirmation of our friendship with the US. 
That's why we should have a say in the debate about it’ 213 214 
While the letter was promoted in the media it failed to have any major impact on the Obama 
administration’s thinking as On September 17th 2009 Obama cancelled the Missile Defense 
project. His justification was that he wanted to switch to an alternative reconfigured system 
designed to shoot down Iranian missiles. Obama called Czech President Fisher at 00:21 am to 
announce the end of the missile defense project. The timing of the cancellation could be 
considered symbolic in a negative sense in that it came on the 70th anniversary of the Nazi 
invasion of Poland. 
Immediate Reactions to shelving of the Project 
• Switch to a more internationalist position among Atlanticists 
The initial immediate impact of the Obama administrations reversal was that there was a 
slight re-orientation with a shift in the balance of view between the Washington- Brussels 
orientation axis towards Brussels.  Previous held sentiment that the Czech Republic somehow 
might enjoy a special relationship with the US quickly evaporated. As highlighted in Chapter 
two prior to this Czech elites especially those surrounded by Vonda felt that the Czech missile 
defense project would contribute to forming some kind of a special relationship between the 
Czech Republic and the US. 215 Instead after the reversal Czech elites who had lost so much 
political capital on the project had to recognize that Czech Republic has just a normal 
relationship with the United States and must adapt accordingly. This shift can be seen in the 
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reaction of Alexandr Vondra who stated that in light of recent events is the proper moment to 
start taking European security seriously and deepen the ties among European allies. 216 
Similarly for Jiri Schneider the initial reaction of Obama’s reversal was that it brought ‘Czech 
Security policy closer towards a pragmatic expectations Vis-a- Vis Washington and brings it 
closer to Brussels’.217 The more pragmatic expectations on the part of ODS politicians 
involved a realization that Czech Republic never had nor never will have a special 
relationship with the US. 218 This shift should be viewed not as abandonment of the 
previously held Atlanticist position towards an Europeanist one but as the Atlantisists shifting 
towards a more internationalist position as outlined in the ideological pool illustration in 
appendix G. Rather than focus on building on a bi-lateral relationship with the US the 
emphasize now for the Czech elites is to work within the NATO and EU framework in their 
relations with America.  ‘ There has been a growing recognition that instead of building a 
special relationship ( Poland) or a strategic relationship ( Czech Republic) with the US 
stronger support for the EU as a global credible actor is needed in order for the EU to be a 
credible actor and politically responsible partner to the US’. 219  
 
Czech Preferences under the new strategic concept – Obsession with Article V 
 
As previously shown the normalization of relations with America should not be reviewed as a 
resignation of the transatlantic agenda but as an adoption of a more internationalist approach. 
In response to this ‘ reset strategy’ and Russia’s escalating attempts at revision, Czechs have 
begun to reexamine the rationale behind their close bilateral ties with the US. In particular 
Czech Republic has reacted by focusing its efforts on the New NATO strategic concept.220 
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These efforts are significant because they reflect the extent to which Russia is fuelling 
demand for elevated territorial defense inside Central Europe.  
 
At a Conference held in Prague in preparation of NATO’s new strategic concept Czech 
officials openly questioned NATO’s security commitment to the Central Europe and appealed 
to the military alliance to strengthen its guarantees. 221 Alexandr Vondra doubted whether the 
"all for one" Article 5 of the NATO charter, which obliges the alliance to come to the defense 
of any member who is attacked, would be adhered to should the Czech Republic or a 
neighboring member state be attacked. "We need a new affirmation, mainly for the new 
NATO member states, that the commitment on joint defense is taken seriously…this also 
concerns the defense planning and the deployment of respective capacities to enable a 
reaction in the case of a crisis‘222 . In particular, Vondra was concerned about Russian policy 
toward the region, saying his concerns are "naturally connected with uncertainties around 
Russia's further development."  Speaking to Jiří Schneider of the Prague Security Studies 
Institute after the Conference he similarly concluded that the Conference highlighted Czech 
Republic’s concern about American commitments to territorial defense of the region.  ‘The 
problem is that we [the Czech Republic] have only been in NATO for 10 years, and, as of yet, 
there has not been a materializing of guarantees. People question whether NATO would be 
willing and able to come to our defense in some future crises," 223 
 
Indeed throughout the Conference Czech participants expressed the view that it would be hard 
to reset the Alliances relations with Russia without new reassurances on Article 5. 224 One 
participant clearly defined the differences in views on Russia between CEE members of 
NATO and the rest of the Alliance by stating that ‘Central European members worry about 
artificially induced conflicts, cyberattacks and disruption of energy flows. The rest of NATO 
is primarily concerned with sending the right signal to Russia’. Also at the Conference was 
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the debate with most Czech participants emphasizing that territorial defense should remain the 
core task of NATO. ‘NATO should distinguish between Article 4 and 5, which is about 
getting things done’. 225  
• Position of Poland greater supporter of ESDP 
Perhaps the most tangible shift towards the ESDP can be seen in the position of Poland. An 
excellent example of the newfound Polish emphasis on ESDP can be seen by a speech 
delivered by Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Radoslaw Sikorski ‘ We support the building 
of a more federal Union, which is able to play in global fields of competition as one of the 
strongest players… I am sure that a Union, which is able to take its fair share of responsibility 
for global affairs, is compatible with interests of the United States’226 . Also it is very 
interesting to note that Poland with begins its EU presidency in July 2011 has made the CFSP 
as one of its priorities of the EU presidency programme. Poland joined force with France a 
country previously very receptive to the Medvedev plan in an effort to work on the European 
security dimension. An interesting development in this process as highlighted by Koran et al 
is that Poland has been attempting to revive the G6 ( Group of Six) platform, an unofficial 
group of six of the EU’s most populated country’s Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain and 
Poland and include the platform in European security tasks.  The original focus of the 
platform was on third pillar issues (Police and Judicial Co-operation in Justice)227 .  
Although tangible shifts have not been so apparent the shift in emphasis by the Czech 
Republic but also Poland towards a greater support of the ESDP within the last 18 months 
should not be underestimated. As Koran at al state ‘ it is obvious that the rock solid pro-US 
orientation of the CEE countries that was long taken for granted has faded, with Poland and to 
a lesser extent the Czech Republic …. Shifting towards the European security architecture and 
policy. 228The above highlighted developments represent a serious departure from the 
previous efforts of Czech elites to attain security through the building of a special relationship 
with the United States. As Hynek and Stritecky eloquently put it ‘ The change of the discourse 
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and an emerging political consensus on strengthening Europe in the area of EU’s Common 
Foreign Security and Defence policy may become one of the most important changes in 
Poland and the Czech Republic in the past decade’229 
 
4.3.  Long term orientation 
Theoretical Basis for Assessing Possible Shifts in Czech Security 
Before I begin my analysis I will first discuss the theoretical basis of how a European state 
like the Czech Republic might shift to a more ‘Europeanist’ position according the academic 
literature written on the possible convergence of European strategic cultures.  In his study on 
this topic Chistoph Meyer asked the question if strategic cultures within the EU are 
converging towards the European norm and if so can this convergence by can explained by 
realist, constructivist or regional theories of change.  Here he identified three main sources 
that could cause a state to shift towards a more Europeanist position in the realm of foreign 
policy, 1 changes in the external environment, 2 Europeanization and 3 conflicts or major 
events. According to Meyer the degree to which these forces will effect national security 
cultures varies differently and depends on a state’s, 1 Geography, 2 Institutional sticking of 
domestic ideas values and norms and 3 the  degree to which societies are subject to social 
contention. 230 
Converging towards a European "orm a state’s Individual characteristics  
In this section I will discuss exactly how a states individual characteristics matter in the 
degree of convergence. In studies of Europeanization it has been argued by scholars that 
member states adaption to the same kinds of incentives and constraints can vary considerably 
depending on different factors, most notably the mediating impact of formal and informal 
institutions. As Meyer shows ‘The same is true for the study of the cognitive impact of 
changed distribution of power capabilities in the international system. Europeanization 
processes and experiences of violent conflicts on constitutive and regulatory norms prevailing 
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national strategic cultures’. For Meyer the adoption process is mediated by three factors: 
geographical position of a given country, the depth and institutionalization of such norms and 
the presence of strong ideological cleavages within a country. 231 
• Geography 
While geography proved to be a major factor in a preference for Atlanticism in the Czech 
Republic, its relevance as a factor could decline and even push the Czech Republic towards 
the CFSP. The Czech Republic obviously will not change location but as Meyer states ‘ the 
preference for the US rather than the EU as a security provider may change gradually as a 
result of negative experiences with the US, as well as positive experience of the EU in dealing 
forcefully with the occasional Russian demands and blackmail attempts… ten years of Post- 
cold war experience are relatively little, however, when compared with long experience with a 
powerful, and over the last 40 years quite malevolent and repressive neighbor in the East’. 232.  
• Stickiness of national security norms and ideas 
Ideas and norms may be deeply internalized or they may be rather shallow. In Czech Republic 
the painful experience of being bargained away by great powers on several occasions and the 
painful experience of being in a non democratic alliance left a cognitive imprint on Czech 
Republic’s strategic thinking. These particular concerns refer to the cognitive ability of the 
Czech Republic elites to cede sovereignty, fully trust European countries with their defense 
and reduce attachment to territorial defense. Having already showed that the Czech Republic 
is moving strongly away from its sovereignist approach233, I see also show that trust towards 
Europe in the security realm is increasing as time goes by but that the Czech Republic will 
remain attached to territorial defense for the forseeable future.  
• How deep strategic culture is Contested along Party Lines 
As Meyer outlines ‘national security cultures may be deeply contested along party lines, 
rendering the impact of convergence forces uneven and hard to predict’. 234 As shown 
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throughout this thesis Czech Republic has two main parties with quite opposing views on 
crucial aspects of security. These opposing views are also shared among the population even 
if the public remains largely disengaged. The result of this means that a change in government 
could dramatically change government policy towards the ESDP and the US even if it is not 
going to alter collectively shared notions within the population.  
• Incidents, wars, Conflicts 
Also Meyer acknowledges that incidents could be the catalyst for a re-orientation. Earlier in 
the previous chapter when I looked at the impact of the Iraq war on Slovakia I showed that in 
a society with deep domestic divisions ( Akin to Czech Republic) it takes very little to shift 
away from a previous strongly held position.  
4.3.1. Societal factors – Position of the government on the left-right wing axis 
In theorizing national strategic cultures Meyer concludes that ‘national security cultures may 
be contested along ideological or party lines, rendering the impact of convergence forces 
uneven and hard to predict’. 235 This means that a change of government could dramatically 
change the orientation of Czech security, even if it is not going to dramatically alter 
collectively shared notions of when the use of force is legitimate. In the previous section I 
highlighted that a divide very much exists between the main political parties as regards which 
orientation Czech Republic should take.  Thus the more left leaning future governments are in 
the Czech Republic the more likely Czech Republic will be to shift towards a more 
Europeanist position. Also looked at here will be public opinion with my argument being that 
as Czech Democracy matures further we will likely foreign policy decisions more in line with 
Public opinion in the country.  
• Orientation of Party/Coalition in Power 
At the time of writing the outcome of the May 29th 2010 elections are yet unknown, the 
outcome of this election however will certainly impact on the orientation of Czech Security. 
In chapter 2 I discussed the institutional stickiness in Czech security policy. Here one could 
see that the influence of the Ministry of Foreign and Ministries of Defence tended very strong 
in foreign policy making over the past 20 years. However recent trends point to Parliament 
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playing an increasingly greater role in foreign policy decision making, 236a trend which is 
likely to continue in the future. Thus the outcome of which party wins upcoming elections is 
likely to have a greater impact on foreign policy making than previous elections.  
The type of government in power and its ideological orientation will influence the countries 
orientation in various situations in the future far more than historical memories. What is 
determinant will be the positions of the rightist or leftist governments who will use 
interpretations of history less and less. A social Democrats government should they win 
upcoming elections will be more likely to adopt a Europeanist position and shift the Czech 
Republic towards Brussels. The impact of this shift will certainly be dependent on the party’s 
coalition partners, with the communist party an option that would speed up this process.  
• Impact on Ministries 
A social democrat victory will also impact on the Ministries of the Czech Republic with 
widespread purges predicted with those in the Ministries receptive to a more Atlanticist 
position expected to be replaced by more ‘ Social democrat thinking’ people. ‘Some things 
are resistant but some things are not when the Social democrats came to power in 1998 there 
were Purges and there were even bigger purges when Vondra become deputy minister’237. In 
anticipation of a possible Social Democrat victory in the upcoming elections purges are 
according to Ditrych very likely ‘It will certainly happen again if Social democrats win but 
the extent to which these purges will occur are hard to say’238. Even before the anticipated 
Purges begin we have already begun to see an overrepresented clique of Atlanticist in 
government and the Ministrie in the Czech Republic begin to lose  power over the past 5 
years. 239   
• Public Opinion 
Over the past 20 years as we have seen public opinion as a factor on Czech foreign policy 
making has not been at the level expected by a more mature Western Democracy. However 
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public opinion as a variable in foreign policy decision making will likely increase as Czech 
democracy matures and the Czech public becomes increasingly interested in foreign policy 
decision making.  Already we have seen that the Social Democrats are far more prone to link 
their foreign policy stances in accordance with public opinion.  
As evidenced by the election campaign of 2010 interest in foreign policy issues remains very 
low in the Czech Republic with foreign policy issues having minimum impact in an election 
campaign dominated by domestic politics. However major issues that touch upon the public 
mind would certainly have the potential to create a debate within Czech society that could 
potentially shift Czech foreign policy away from its Atlanticist position. As shown in the case 
study of Iraq, Czech Republic missed an opportunity to reassess the orientation of its security 
policy as the left wing Social Democrats become the standard bearers of the war. If the more 
right wing parties were in power during the unpopular Iraq war then it would have been likely 
that a debate and divide in Czech society among the Europeanist anti Iraq War Social 
Democrats and the Atlanticist ODS would have come to the fore with a public debate 
emerging on the issue of the orientation of Czech foreign and security. The possibility on 
another event emerging that puts the Czech Republic in a bind between its Atlanticist elite and 
largely Europeanist public would have the potential to change this and for the first time a 
genuine debate on the orientation of Czech Foreign and Security policy among the public 
could begin. 
4.3.2. Russia the key variable– Energy, Eastern Partnership and Architecture 
As I showed in Chapter 3 Czech actions in aligning so close America (Iraq, missile defense) 
or within the EU framework (energy, Eastern partnership) are either directly or indirectly 
linked to their fear of Russian influence in the Czech Republic. In order for the Czech 
Republic to become a stronger supporter on the CFSP in the future one extremely important 
variable will be the necessity for the EU to form a common consensus on how to deal with 
Russia. As this thesis has shown despite some convergence in many important aspects 
between ‘New’ and ‘Old’ member states Central European governments do tend to view the 
world differently than their Western counterparts in certain aspects. Increasingly in the post-
Georgia war setting these governments have developed a sharp sensitivity to Russian geo-
political presence.  
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One major divide between East and West can be seen in the question of how best to deal with 
Russia. As Llves points out ‘Uncomfortable as it may be to hear, and as it is to say, the 
behavior of the old EU member states towards Russia has often been viewed among the 
Central and Eastern Europeans as naïve at best, mendacious at worst…indeed new member 
states elites fear that when it comes to Russia, individual member states interests will triumph 
over the interests of the Union if a good bilateral deal can be had’240. In Czech Republic and 
the CEE region Russia represents a discernible gap between the position of CEE and Western 
Europe. Old member states view Czech Republic and other CEE states as dangerously Russo 
phobic. This perceived Russo phobia is treated as a threat to foreign policy and as a threat to 
bilateral opportunities in dealing with Russia. In contrast CEE countries see old member 
states perceived nearsightedness on Russia and the preponderance of bilateral national 
interests as a real threat to the European CFSP.  Bridging this gap will be one of the principal 
needs and one in which the current and future success of a common European Foreign and 
Security Policy will deepen on and also one in which the position of Germany will be very 
important.  
The preferences for the US rather than the EU as a security provider may change gradually as 
a result of positive experience of the EU in dealing forcefully with Russia demands. As 
Chistoph Meyer states in his research on the Convergence of European strategic cultures ‘ ten 
years of Post Cold War experience are relatively little, when compared with the long 
experience with a powerful, and over the last 40 years, quite malevolent and repressive 
neighbor in the East’. 241One academic who agrees with this assessment on the importance of 
the EU finding a consensus of how to deal with Russia is Nik Hynek. ‘I think that the position 
adapted towards Russia position will be important, they need to find a consensus on how to 
deal with Russia, if don’t find a consensus you are not going to speak about a strong European 
security project.  ’242 More recently one of the trends we have seen is the lowering distance 
between the old and new Europe in how to deal with Russia but still the German position 
towards Russia remains very different to that of the Visegrad four.   
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• Energy Security 
In particular between these two blocs Germany and CEE states there is a need to carve out a 
consensus on how to deal with Russia in the energy realm.  To date we can see that Germany 
has been very careful to deal with Russia as part of a multi-lateral approach as far as security 
is concerned but in its energy relations Germany has adopted a bi-lateral approach with 
Russia overlooking the complains of other EU states. Evidence of this can be seen in the 
German’s courting of Russia to build the Nord Stream pipeline directly from Russia to 
Germany, which much to the dismay of some of CEE countries bypassed them. 243  Germany 
interests in attempting not to offend Russia have been deeply rooted. In fact the Khol 
government of the 1990s stood opposed to Baltic countries membership of the EU lest Russia 
be offended. 244 
The issue is not solely to do with interests but also divergent perceptions. One major divide 
between Germany and the CEE has to do with perceptions with the Czech Republic and CEE 
countries seeing energy as a security issue something not shared with their German 
counterparts. The core of the problem has been the failure of the CEE countries to see energy 
security from a German perspective as being part of their overall security project.  ‘Central 
Europe needs to understand this dichotomy in security and foreign policy. Once they 
understand this they can talk to Germany in better fashion and then forge consensus on how to 
deal with Russia’ 245 
• Eastern Partnership 
Europe also needs to take a united approach towards its Eastern neighborhood. As shown in 
Chapter two among the greatest concern to the Czech republic will be the ‘ weakness’ of the ‘ 
new neighborhood’ states such as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Georgia. Cross border 
crime, illegal immigration and human trafficking have been long term concerns for the Czech 
Republic and as the income between the Czech Republic and these new member states 
increases, these worries will increase. Of greatest concern will be the nature of these regimes 
and the degree to which Russia can be seen to be meddling in the internal domestic politics of 
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these states. In this regard the recent election of President Yanukovych as President in 
Ukraine will be viewed with concern in the Czech Republic. The President’s recent deal to 
extend the lease on the Black sea Russian fleet in Ukraine in return for cheaper gas will have 
been interpreted as Ukraine somewhat turning its back on possible EU accession and moving 
further towards Russia. However Ukrainian politics is pendulum by nature and with its 
tendencies to swing between Europe and Russia a reattempt by Ukraine to move away from 
Russia and towards Europe in the future should be viewed as a distinct possibility. With a 
‘Wider Europe’ the cornerstone of Czech Republic’s priorities within the CFSP greater 
support from Western Members states will prove good for a more united European approach. 
Russia’s meddling and aggressiveness in the new neighborhood and acceptance by some 
Western European member states that Russia has a legitimate sphere of influence are totally 
unacceptable for Czech elites. A success of the EU in the Eastern Neighborhood can be seen 
during the Georgian crises when the EU showed a united front in dealing with Russia and 
negotiated a ceasefire settlement. Actions such as this are good for gaining Czech support for 
the ESDP but question remains whether Europe will remain show such a united in dealing 
with Russia if another crises arrives.  
Under a united approach the EU should encourage the countries in Europe’s Eastern 
neighborhood to adapt European norms and regulations. It must also be kept in mind that it all 
rankings of power (Hard or soft) the EU outranks Russia. The EU’s combined economy is 15 
times the size of Russia’s, its population three and a half times bigger, and the EU buys 56% 
of Russian exports while Russia buys 6 % of EU imports. From a market sense Russia needs 
the EU and has no practical alternative in the short or medium term to supplying gas to the 
EU.  
• Security architecture 
In dealing with Russia there is a growing recognition that a new security architecture will be 
needed, yet which architecture will be adopted remains a major question. Indeed this 
recognition of needing a new security architecture can be traced to Obama’s reset strategy 
with Russia. As Hynek and Stritecky point out ‘ there has been a growing understanding in 
Poland and the Czech Republic that a stronger Europe with its own reinvigorated security 
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architecture is needed for dealing effectively with Russia’ 246The first step that needs to be 
taken is to reject the Medvedev plan, a plan which seeks to divide Europe.   
A continued different approach between Old and New member states over how to deal with 
Russia cannot continue for long. Without willingness on the part of New Member states to 
take into account and defend the interests of CEE member states on matters that are of gravest 
concern to them, the CFSP’s popularity will decline among the Czech public and elites. If the 
national interests of old member states dominate EU-Russian relations, the new member states 
will once again look to the US.  Old member states should contain themselves and adopt a 
policy of ‘principled bi-literalism’ as advocated by Leonard and Popescu in their report on 
EU-Russian relations. This goal would be to ensure that bilateral contacts Russia and 
individual member states would reinforce rather than undermine common EU objectives.  
4.3.3. Europeanization 
The concept of strategic culture brings with it an additional advantage in that it allows one to 
consider changes in security preferences. Several scholars in their study of the ESDP and 
CFSP have found that Europeanization of foreign policy have been a major factor in shifting 
countries to become greater supporters of the ESDP project. This is especially strong in 
Neutral countries such as Finland which have seen major shifts in their security preferences 
away from neutrality and more in line with European norm. During the 1990s and prior to EU 
accession Czech elites were socialized through the NATO framework but more and more we 
are likely to see this socialization process take place within EU institutions. 247 Baun and 
Marek in their study of Europeanization of Czech foreign policy concluded that over the past 
6 years Czech foreign policy has only been Europeanized to a limited extent and that EU 
influence on Czech foreign policy decision making is very small relative to domestic factors. 
248 For them limited socialization is largely determined by the Czech Republic’s (pre 1989) 
historical experience and perceptions of Czech geographical vulnerability. However the 
authors do acknowledge that socialization as a variable is likely to become more influential 
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overtime as Czech Republic accumulates experience in European Defence structures and see’s 
the EU as a framework in which it can achieve its goals.  
From my own experience as an Irish citizen I would remark that the ‘socializing’ effect of EU 
membership can sometimes be exaggerated and in the experience of Ireland the country is 
now ‘more neutral’ than when it became an EU member in 1973. Learning processes and 
spillover effects do not have the same strength in the intergovernmental cooperation of the 
EU’s second pillar as in the supranational pillar.  Thus socialization taken on its own without 
the support of other variable is unlikely to be a major cause of the Czech Republic to shift to a 
more Europeanist position.  
4.3.4.  What type of EU emerges – Powerful and in tandem with US  
Also important will be what type of CFSP emerges. As has been highlighted throughout this 
research the Czech Republic will only support the CFSP in the short and medium term so long 
as its aims do not conflict with those of NATO. In this sense they do not want to see any 
decoupling between the two organizations. Following the Iraq war one of the main aims of the 
Czech Republic and other CEE states was to repair the relationship between the United States 
and Europe. Such attempts have been successful with the France model which sought to 
promote a European defense project as a counter to the United States no longer seen as a 
viable option among policymakers and politicians throughout Europe. 249 Now the consensus 
very much seems to be in Europe for the ESDP to develop in tandem with the United States. 
Czech Republic for the foreseeable future will back a Europe with a Euro-Atlantic orientation 
and disapprove of a stronger EU as a counterbalance to the terms. The development of the 
French model of Europe as a counter to the US is seen by the Czechs as a threat to US 
engagements in the region, but also inefficient and costly. 250 
The EU also needs to start investing more in the ESDP project and increase its military 
capabilities considerably if it wants to be seen as a viable alternative to the US by CEE states 
in the long term. In light of recent developments with regards the EU currency the principle of 
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solidarity251 one of the pillars upon which the EU has been based has been called into 
question. Such developments lower trust among member states and does not bode well for an 
ESDP which will need considerable investment over the coming years if it hopes to move 
away from civilian missions and become a military might in the mould of powers such as the 
US and China.  
However a consensus also needs to be reached on what is the optimal way to divide 
competencies between the EU, US and NATO. The growing trend seem to be that the best 
option would be for a European security project that is run by the EU member states without 
the United States but to maintain the NATO relationship with the United States. This setup of 
community and alliance by two different entities also brings advantages in that it will appease 
Russian concerns of too much US influence in Europe. The benefit of this setup is that Europe 
would maintain its link to NATO and its article V guarantees and could seek to divide 
coupling between the CFSP and NATO. 252 
4.3.5.   US policies towards Europe and the World 
The last major variable that will impact on the orientation of Czech Security will be the 
actions of the United States both towards Europe and the World. Recent trends suggest that 
the Obama administration’s interest is low not just in Central Europe but in Europe as a 
whole. 253 A declining interest in Europe will likely see Europe take more responsibility for 
themselves in the security realm something that the American’s have been pushing for a 
number of years and something they will likely support254. America is also likely to be 
pleased if Central European governments while maintaining their Atlanticist orientation also 
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the moment Europe’s greatest concern in to keep internal unity and prevent the emergence of a North – South 
divide. 252Also the view of the Czech Republic and other CEE countries tends to be close to the standpoint of 
Britain. The recent accession of a Euro-Skeptic Prime Minister in David Cameron does not bode well for 
European integration but Cameron’s impact should not be overestimated.  
253 This can be evidenced  among other things the Presidents decision not to attend this years EU- US summit in 
Madrid 
254 Initially the US were hesitant to the idea of a common European foreign policy but have since become great 
supporters of the project  
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become greater supporters of the CFSP project. Indeed recent efforts by the Czech Republic 
in becoming greater supporters of the CFSP have been well received in the United States. In 
October 2009 Vice-President Joe Biden came on a trip to Czech Republic to reassure 
concerned Czechs about America’s commitment to the region. One of the key aims of the trip 
was to confirm the normalization of relations between the two countries but also to encourage 
these countries to ‘become partners rather than protégées of the United States’255. However 
the role of partners still requires that the US takes Czech and CEE interests into account when 
making decisions. The Czech Republic will not be a satisfied partner if the US continues to 
prioritize relations with Russia over Central Europe and cuts deals directly with Russia 
without Czech involvement and at the Czech’s expense.  
This declining interest in Europe also needs to be weighed up in a global context against the 
overall decline of the US as a superpower. 256The situation with which the Czech Republic 
was presented in 1989 when it had to choose whether to align with the world’s only 
superpower or not is very different to today where we can witness the tracings of a much 
more multi-polar world emerging. This relative decline of US power will likely result in both 
the trend of a declining US interest in Europe continuing as time, power and money must be 
invested only into regions and countries that are considered a priority of the US 
administration.  
Finally the model of international relations which the US pursues will affect how closely the 
Czech Republic is likely to align itself in the future. With Public opinion likely to increase as 
a factor in foreign policy decision making, close alignment will only be supported if America 
adopts a more multi-lateralist model of international relations than those pursued under 
President George W Bush. Memories and gratitude towards the US for the creation of the 
Czech state in 1918 and liberation in WW2 while so vital in the Atlanticist orientation in the 
1990s will becoming less and less important as the years. Increasingly more recent memories 
of the US as a neo-conservative hegemon under Bush or as a defecter under Obama will 
replace the previously wide held positive image of America in the Czech Republic. It will be 
up to American to reinvent itself and appeal to the Czech public who more naturally align 
                                                           
255Hynek and Stritecky: opt cit: 11 
256 America’s overall ‘ reset strategy’ towards Russia and Medvedev’s new security architecture can be 
interpreted as Russia seeking to take advantage of both declining American power and also declining American 
interest in Central Europe.  
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themselves with the European model of international relations which places emphasis on 
multilateral institutions, democracy, human rights and international law. 257 For now and in 
the short and medium term the Czech Republic not support a non divisive setting between 
NATO and the EU but in the long term the US must return to effective multilateralism.  
Recommendations 
 Europe 
Optimal Scenario: Czech Republic and CEE countries emerge as full supporters in the ESDP 
project and in issues of intra-Alliance or intra-European debate can be counted on to support a 
pro-European viewpoint.  
• Achieve Consensus on who to deal with Russia 
• Support CEE preferences in Eastern neighborhood 
• Common energy policy  
• Increase military capabilities 
• Develop in tandem with US 
The US 
Optimal Scenario: CEE’s countries influence increases the EU’s security capabilities and 
reinforces the transatlantic connection  
• Reinforce ties with Czech Republic and CEE states through security commitments 
• Change from ‘ energy centric’258 approach to a more allied centric approach 
• Encourage Czech Republic and CEE states to promote transatlantic unity 
• Work with Europe on energy security 
• Renew involvement in Europe’s neighborhood and reject Russia sphere of influence  
                                                           
257 This is also linked to power with IR theory as a general showing that the weaker the state the more likely to 
states elite and public will put emphasis on multi-lateral institutions and human rights 
258 Speech by Alexandr Vondra, Moving the transatlantic partnership beyond the Prague agenda’, May 25th 2010, 
http://www.acus.org/event/moving-transatlantic-partnership-beyond-prague-agenda 
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4.4. Research Objectives: Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
In section 1.3 I outlined my research objectives and in section I outline my findings to these 
questions. 
Research Objectives One 
To identify how a small state in the International system such as the Czech Republic attempts 
to maximize their security in the current international system  
Summary of Findings: Small states seek to maximize their security by balancing against 
perceived threats. This threat can be best explained by a Constructivist lens which takes into 
account perceptions and ideas about what constitutes a threat better than Walt’s balance of 
threat theory.  
Research Objective Two 
To account for Czech preferences for alliances over neutrality 
Summary of Findings: Czech preference for alliance over neutrality can be linked a formative 
experience in Czech history ( The Munich Conference) when a largely defensive strategy 
failed to prevent Nazi occupation. As a result of the process of learning as shown by Reiter’s 
theory Czech Republic switched to a policy of more active engagement in alliances in an 
effort to ensure alliances stay credible.  
Research Objective Three 
• To explore whether the Czech Republic has a strategic culture and if so to identify 
what are the main determinants influencing Czech Security culture.  
Summary of Findings: Czech Republic has elements of strategic culture. Among the elite 
there is a general consensus of what constitutes a threat ( Russia) and the best way to deal 
with this threat. ( Atlanticism). This security culture is not shared among the general 
population but among the Czech elite. Even among the elite there is a growing divide 
emerging on how best to deal with the threat with some favoring an Atlanticist approach and 
others advocating a more Europe approach. 259 
Research Objective Four 
                                                           
259 For more information see Illustration X ‘Map of Czech strategic culture’ 
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• To critically account for the origins and motivations behind Prague’s strong sense of 
Atlanticism in security policy.  
Summary of Findings: Atlanticism is rooted in Czech Republic’s geopolitical history. This 
includes being a small power in central Europe which has had negative encounters with Nazi 
Germany and the Communist regime over the past century. It is also attributed to the support 
shown by the US during the formative period 1993-1999 when America pushed for Czech 
integration into Europe Atlantic institutions and is also a strategic calculations among Czech 
elites that active engagement with America isthe best way to balance against Russia. 
Research Objective Five 
• To critically assess of strength of Czech Republic’s Atlanticism and gauge its 
durability. 
Summary of Findings: In the short and medium term Czech Republic will continue to see 
NATO as the main security provider to the CEE region. Atlanticism in the sense of trying to 
formulate strong direct bi-lateral relations with the US has already begun to decline and there 
is a growing recognition that Czech Republic should now deal with the US through the EU or 
NATO framework. There is a growing support in creating a strong European defence project 
in response to America’s disengagement from Europe and Russia’s escalating attempts at 
revisionism. Long term durability of Atlanticism will be depend on which political 
party/coalition is in power, what type of EU emerges, which party ( EU or US) proves more 
adept in dealing with Russia and Europe’s neighborhood and on US policy towards the 
region.  
Research Objective Six 
• To critically access if Czech support for the CFSP project is increasing and what the 
future position of the Czech Republic towards the CFSP is likely to be. 
Summary of Findings: Czech support for the project is increasing and will continue to 
increase in the future.  In light of recent events there is a growing recognition of Europe as a 
second pillar and a need to create a strong Europe in the military realm which works in 
tandem with the United States. Support for the CFSP will be depend on which political 
party/coalition is in power, what type of EU emerges, which party ( EU or US) proves more 
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adept in dealing with Russia and Europe’s neighborhood and on US policy towards the 
region. 
 
4.5. Final Word 
The pro-Atlanticist orientation of the Czech Republic stems from the countries historical 
experience and lack of faith in the effectiveness of European security policy. However Czech 
attitudes towards the US and EU are extremely complex with a divide among the public but 
also between and within parties.  Czech affinity towards the US and Czech gratitude for the 
role that the US has played in the history of the Czech state is a major factor in the Atlanticist 
action of the Czech Republic in the realm of foreign and security policy over the past 20 
years.  Czech positive attitudes towards the US should not be interpreted as permanent and 
has already begun to decline partially as the result of US actions and partially as a result of a 
growing appreciation towards the role that Europe can play in promoting Czech foreign and 
security policy interests. Czech Republic’s Atlanticist orientation can be expected to decline 
in upcoming decades with a greater emphasis being placed on the CFSP. How far the Czech 
Republic will come to view the CFSP as the best protector of its interests will be dependent 
on how much Old member states are willing to adapt a New member state friendly approach 
to Russia and how close the CFSP aligns itself with America. Without a united coherent 
approach from the EU on how to deal with these issues Czech Republic a shift back towards 
Atlanticism cannot be ruled out.  
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Apendix A 
List of Interviewee’s  
 Advisor to Alexandr Vondra : ( Anonomous), May 8th 2010 
 Benes, Vit : Research Fellow,  Institute of International Relations, May 20th 2010 
 Cadier, David : PHD candidate Science Po Paris, May 1st 2010 
 Ditrych, Ondrej: Charles University Prague, May 7th 2010 
 Havranek , Jan:  Independent Foreign policy analyst, Graduate of  Security Studies Fletcher School 
of Diplomacy 
 Hynek Nik : Research Fellow, Charles University Prague, April 21st 2010 
 Kral , David :  Research Fellow, Europeum , May 18th 2010 
 Schneider, Jiri  : Programe Director of Prague Security Studies Institute, 8th April 2010 
 Stritecky Vit : Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations,May 7th 2010 
 Ministy of Defence : ( Anonomous), April 22nd 2010 
 Neuman, Marat : PHD Candidate Groningen University, May 10th 2010 
 Weiss, Tomas :  Research Fellow Europeum, May 18th 2010 
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• Definition 
Security culture for this analysis is defined as ‘ a set of Socially transmitted norms, attitudes and 
traditions, habits of mind, preferred modes of co-operation, perceptions of the international 
environment that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community 
that has a unique historical experience’.  
The Czech Republic has had an inverse strategic culture (not shared among the wider population) 
that is shared among the countries security community (leading party politicians or security experts 
with the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs) that has dominated the security discourse since 
1989.260 Within this community they have a general consensus on the threats (Russia) and on the 
resulting modes of co-operation. (Atlanticism).  
• Determinants 
Rooted in geopolitical history , its position in Central Europe as a small state with history of 
occupation and invasion by foreign powers (Hapsburgs, Nazi Germany and Russia) and linked to 
perception of Russia 
Small State 
Small state with 10 million citizen’s located in Central Europe surrounded by larger states 
Formative experiences 
1918, 1938, 1968, 1989, 1993-1999261 
Perceptions of Russia 
Czech Republic has a strong uninformed strategic culture which is linked to threat perception of 
Russia and is rooted in socio historic context (40 years of Communist rule and 1968 invasion)  
                                                           
260 The Czech Republic does not have a united full blown security culture in that the security community is 
relativem new ( 20 years). In this sense Czech Republic lacks certain basis for analysing security culture. My 
aim here is to outline certain element sof Czech Security culture rather than attempt to formulate a fully blown 
security culture.  
 
261 For information on the lessons learned during these formative experiences please see Appendix C 
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Czech Republic’s Atlanticist orientation ( either through or direct bi-lateral ties with the US) and the 
resulting position this beings (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Missile Defense) is all linked to their 
overarching motivation of keeping American presence in Europe alive and credible which in as effort 
to check direct Russian influence in its affairs’. 
Within the ESDP and CFSP Czech preferences of strong transatlantic alliance, energy security and 
Eastern partnership is an effort to check Russia influence in its affairs.262 
• Domestic Factors 
Political Parties 
Divide among the main political parties ODS more Atlanticist while CSSD more Pro European263 
Ministries 
The Ministry of Foreign affairs and Ministry of Defence have been very influential in decision making 
since 1989 and both tend to be Atlanticist institutions. The MoD is more Atlanticist that the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs who are more likely to take into accounts the interests of European member states.  
 
What Constitutes Czech Security Culture 
• Area of Co-operation - Preference for a strong US in NATO or strong bi-lateral ties with the 
US. This is the preference of the Atlanticist community who have largely dominated the 
discourse in the Czech Republic since 1989 and are strong within the ODS party and Ministry 
of Defense. This preference is not shared among the CSSD.  
• Purpose for the Use of force- Attachment to territorial Defense. Czech Republic is attached to 
Article V of NATO and sees this as the organizations primary role (Uneasiness about NATO 
moving away from territorial defense towards other goals) 
                                                           
262 Whichever ( EU, NATO/US)  is perceived  as being the best promoter of Czech interests vis-à-vis Russia in 
the future will likely see Czech Republic orientate in their direction.  
 
263 For more Information see appendix F 
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• Basis for CZ policy – Niche specialization for missions abroad but can this can be linked back 
to attachment to territorial defense.  
• Alliance versus neutrality – Strong Preference for alliance while neutrality as an option has no 
basis( This is linked to 1938 when largely defensive strategy failed) 
• Large versus small state – Small state of 10 million but surrounded by large Russian state to 
the East and bigger states within Europe, its preference to align with US can be seen within a 
geo-political context (As a way  to balance against Russia but also against domination of 
Europe by the larger states) 
• Pro- Active engagement – Preference for dealing with threats early and outside the Czech 
mainland ( Again result of suffering from a defensive stance in 1938) 
• Promote human rights and democracy – strong advocate of pushing human rights and 
democracy (Can be linked to history under communism, it is best displayed in Czech policy 
towards Cuba and Belarus with Havel as the symbolic leader of this approach.  
Preferences with Alliances 
Within ESDP it is an advocate of civilian rather than military capabilities and has preference for 1 
strong transatlantic co-operation, 2 European energy security  3 Eastern partnership 
Within NATO - Preference for strong US leadership -  supports missions abroad but attachment to 
territorial defense (Article V).  
Within Multi-lateral institutions – preference for multi-lateral institutions that can work towards the 
prevention of security threats but unwilling to rely multi-lateral institutions such as the UN to provide 
for its security (linked to bad historical experience with League of Nations during the Inter War 
period) 
Durability of Czech Security Culture 
Elements that are durable 
• Support for Human rights 
• Democratic transformation ( Cuba and Belarus) 
• Alliances above neutrality 
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Elements that have strong potential to change 
Area of co-operation – EU vs. US/NATO – The strong preference for a US led NATO or bi-lateral ties 
with the US has been held together by the ruling coalition and Atlanticist leaning Ministry of Defense 
and Foreign Affairs but has the potential  to change.  
Causes of this change 
• Coalition in power-  The more left leaning the party the more likely that Czech Republic will 
move closer to a Europeanist position ( Czech Atlanticism increases as one goes from left to 
right along the political spectrum) 
• Strong Public Opinion - The general public is largely uninformed and not wholly interested in 
foreign affairs. Public opinion as a factor over the past 20 years has not been at the level of 
West European democracies. However a major event under certain circumstances could 
create a public debate on the orientation of Czech Security. In general the public are more in 
line with the Europeanist model of international relations with the CSSD’s position is more 
reflective of public opinion 
• Degree of Europeanization – Thus far very limited Europeanization within Czech foreign 
policy with interests still largely determined by pre 1989 historical experience and 
geographical vulnerability however further Europeanization is possible as Czech Republic 
accumulates experience in EU foreign policy institutions.  
• Changes in the external environment - America’s declining power and interest in Central 
Europe and Europe in general could cause a further shift towards an Europeanist position. 
For America Europe and its Eastern neighborhood no longer represents a priority.  (This 
decline is reflected in a more active approach of Russia in its near abroad) 
Top Down Changes                                          Bottom up  
External environment                                     Political party in power 
Socialization 
• Conclusion 
Future Orientation of Czech Security culture 
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National strategic culture of the Czech Republic is rooted along party lines rendering the move 
towards European security culture hard to predict, key determinants will be which coalition is in 
power, the strength of the CFSP, its ability to deal with Russia and promote Czech interests within the 
alliance and US policy towards Central Europe.  
 
Apendix C 
The Impact of formative events on Czech Security Policy 
1. Event: 1918 Creation of the Czechoslovakian state 
Lesson 
 America a guarantor of small nations 
Sovereignty is possible with the help of great powers 
Impact today: 
 American seen by many as a benign hegemony without territorial ambitions in the region (In the 
negotiations on Missile Defense America not viewed as imperialist power) 
2. Event: 1938 Munich Conference 
Event: Abandoned by its allies 
Lesson 
• Pursue a policy of alliance over neutrality 
• Keep alliances credible 
• Keep American commitments to the region alive and credible 
• Deal with threats at an early stage at a distance from Czech territories 
• Distrust of European powers to provide security to Czech Republic 
• Do not rely on only one ally 
• Work within Multilateral Institutions but do not trust them to provide security 
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• Strengthen bi-lateral ties with powerful allies 
Impact Today 
• No culture of neutrality 
• Strong involvement inside NATO ( e.g. Kosovo, Afghanistan) in an effort to keep the alliance 
credible 
• Strong efforts to keep America engaged in Europe ( Missile Defense project, Transatlantic 
relations priority under Czech EU Presidency) 
• Deal with threats at early stage from Czech territory  
• Strong preference for NATO instead of ESDP within Atlanticist Community 
• Efforts to create a strong bi-lateral or even a ‘Special relationship’ with the US 
3. 1948 
Event: Communist Coup 
Lesson 
• Dissatisfaction towards elites 
Impact Today 
• A gulf between the public and politicians 
• Disinterest among the general population towards foreign policy 
4. 1968  
Event: Soviet invasion of Czech Republic 
Lesson 
• Be part of a democratic alliance 
• Territorial Defense is priority 
• Fear of Russia 
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• Secure Immediate borders 
Impact today 
• Strong attachment to article V of NATO 
• Policies towards NATO, US and ESDP are reflective of perception of the Russian threat 
• Czech’s strong supporters of human rights across the world – policy towards Cuba 
5. 1989 
Event fall of Communism 
Lesson 
• Promote human rights and democracy  
• Pursue policies of pressure not engagement in defeating oppressive regimes 
Impact today 
• Czech policy towards Belarus – very critical- more reflective of US policy that European policy 
during Communist 
6. 1993-1999 
Event: Integration into Euro-Atlantic structures 
Lesson 
• American a champion of Czech cause 
• American can help Czech Republic transcend dilemma of living in Central Europe 
Impact today  
Strong Atlanticist orientation of security policy 1989-2009 
7. 2009? 
Event Obama reset strategy and reversal of Missile Defense 
Lesson 
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Central Europe not a priority for America 
Impact today 
• Greater support for ESDP as a second pillar of defense 
• No more efforts to formulate a ‘ special relationship’ with US  
Appendix D 
Table 4: Parties in the Czech Parliament 
 
Term 
Parties Represented in the 
Parliament (Chamber of Deputies) – 
Election Results and Mandates 
Governing 
Coalition 
1990 – 1992 
 
(Czech National Council) 
OF 49.5% (124) 
KSČ 13.2% (33) 
HSD – SMS 10% (23) 
KDU – 8.4% (20) 
OF 
1992-1996 
 
ODS 29.7% 
KSCM 14.1. % 
CSSD – 6.5% 
LSU 6.5% 
KDU – CSL 6.3% 
SPR- RSC 6% 
ODA 5.9% 
HSD-SMS- 5.9% 
ODS-KDS-KDU-CSL- 
ODA 
 
1996-1998 
 
ODS 29.6% 
CSSD – 26.4% 
KSCM – 10.3% 
KDU-CSL – 8.08% 
SPR-RSC – 8% 
ODA 6.36% 
ODS-KDS-KDU-ČSL-
ODA 
1998-2002 
 
CSSD 32.3% 
ODS 27.7% 
CSSD minority 
government 
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KSCM 11% 
KDU-CSL – 9% 
US 8.6% 
 
2002-2006 
 
CSSD 30.2% 
ODS 24.5% 
KSCM 18.5% 
KDU-CSL- 14.3% 
US – 14.3 %264 
CSSD- KDU-CSL- US 
 
2006 – 2009 
 
ODS 35.38% 
CSSD- 32.32 % 
KSCM – 7.23% 
SZ- 6.29  
ODS- KDU- CSL- SZ 
 
 
ČSSD  Česka strana socialně demokraticka 
 (Czech Social Democratic Party) 
HSD – SMS  Hnuti za samospravnou demokracii – Společnost pro Moravu 
 a Slezsko (Movement for Self-Government Democracy – Union 
 for Moravia and Silesia) 
KDU  Křesťanska a de\mokraticka unie (Christian and Democratic Union) 
KDU – ČSL  Křesťansko-demokraticka unie – Československa strana lidova 
 (Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party) 
KDS  Křesťanska demokraticka strana (Christian Democratic Party) 
KSČ  Komunisticka strana Československa 
 (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) 
KSČM  Komunisticka strana Čech a Moravy 
 (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) 
LSU  Liberalně – socialni unie (Liberal Social Union) 
ODA  Občanska demokraticka aliance (Civic Democratic Alliance) 
ODS  Občanska demokraticka strana (Civic Democratic Party) 
OF  Občanske Forum (Civic Forum) 
                                                           
264 KDU and US in coalition 
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SPR – RSČ  Sdruženi pro republiku – Republikanska strana Československa 
 (Union for the Republic – Czechoslovak Republican Party) 
SZ  Strana zelenych (Green Party) 
US  Unie Svobody (Freedom Union) 
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Annex G Recommendations 
 Europe 
Optimal Scenario: Czech Republic and CEE countries emerge as full supporters in the ESDP project 
and in issues of intra-Alliance or intra-European debate can be counted on to support a pro-European 
viewpoint.  
• Achieve Consensus on who to deal with Russia 
• Support CEE preferences in Eastern neighborhood 
• Common energy policy and united approach in dealing with Russia 
• Increase military capabilities 
• Develop in tandem with US 
The US 
Optimal Scenario: CEE’s countries influence increases the EU’s security capabilities and reinforces the 
transatlantic connection  
• Reinforce ties with Czech Republic and CEE states through security commitments 
• Encourage Czech Republic and CEE states to promote transatlantic unity 
• Work with Europe on energy security 
• Renew involvement in Europe’s neighborhood and reject Russia sphere of influence  
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Annex F: Different approaches to foreign policy issues among two main parties 
• Position towards US 
• ODS – Czech Republic should make every effort to formulate strong relationship with US 
either through NATO or direct bi-lateral relationship 
• CSSD – Relations with US should be through the EU or NATO framework 
• Russia 
• CSSD – much more pragmatic – tends to emphasize economic benefits over ideological  
• ODS – much more Russia skeptic 
• ESDP 
• ODS – ESDP must not develop as a substitute to NATO 
• CSSD – Supports to development of a strong ESDP 
• NATO 
• ODS – NATO primary vehicle for European defense 
• CSSD- Supports NATO but tends to be more enthusiastic about ESDP 
• Deeper European Integration 
• ODS – has skeptical elements in the party – those surrounding Klaus see it as a threat to 
Czech sovereignty  
• CSSD – Pro-Strong European integration 
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